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INTRODUCTION

Trafficking in human beings, characterized as “modern day slavery,”
has emerged as a global problem. According to the U.S. State Department’s
2008 Trafficking in Persons Report, 170 of the world’s countries have a
significant trafficking problem and are countries of destination, origin, and/
or transit.1 Through the mechanism of money laundering, the proceeds derived from a multiplicity of criminal activities are integrated into international or domestic financial and banking sectors so that perpetrators of the
crimes may enjoy their profits within the legitimate economy.
In 2000, the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Transnational Crime Convention)2 and the Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Trafficking Protocol)3 were opened for signature. In the same year,4
1. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 3, 8, 10 (2008) [hereinafter 2008
TIP REPORT].
2. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25,
Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Transnational Crime Convention].
3. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,
G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Trafficking
Protocol].
4. In fact, the two instruments were adopted within a month of each other.
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the U.S. Congress enacted the Trafficking Victims Protection Act5 (TVPA)
as part of a package of legislation that included efforts against domestic
violence and child kidnapping. The international and U.S. domestic instruments offer multilateral and unilateral methodologies and frameworks for
understanding and combating the modern traffic in human beings.
Not least of these methodologies is the U.S. State Department’s annual
Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP Report), issued pursuant to congressional mandate, which directs that countries be ranked according to their
level of compliance with the minimum level of anti-trafficking efforts specified by Congress. Countries whose efforts do not satisfy the specified standards face the threat of U.S. sanctions. Eight years after the passage of the
international and U.S. instruments, while information gathering, scholarly
analysis and writings, legislative enactments, and law enforcement task
force formation and enforcement actions have increased internationally and
domestically, there is little evidence that the anti-trafficking efforts are succeeding in forging and creating compliance with global anti-trafficking
standards.6 The 2008 TIP Report included fourteen countries ranked Tier 3
and forty countries ranked in the Tier 2 watch list.7 Many of these countries
had been listed at these noncompliant levels in previous TIP Reports.8
In contrast, in 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an independent inter-governmental organization that was created by the Group of
Seven countries (the G-7)9 in 1989 and whose Forty Recommendations
5. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 2A, 114 Stat. 1464
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7112 (2000)).
6. Some estimates of the number of trafficking victims have declined over the years. U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HUMAN TRAFFICKING: BETTER DATA, STRATEGY, AND REPORTING NEEDED TO ENHANCE U.S. ANTITRAFFICKING EFFORTS ABROAD (2006) [hereinafter 2006
GAO REPORT]. However, each year, the TIP Report features newly added countries with trafficking problems. For example, in 2008, the Republic of the Congo was added to the Tier rankings for
the first time. See 2008 TIP REPORT, supra note 1, at 44.
7. 2008 TIP REPORT, supra note 1, at 44. The Tier system of the TIP Report is discussed in
detail in Part II. Compare the Tier rankings in the 2008 TIP Report with the Tier rankings in the
2007 and 2006 TIP Reports. U.S. STATE DEP’T, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 42 (2007)
[hereinafter 2007 TIP REPORT]; U.S. STATE DEP’T, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 46 (2006)
[hereinafter 2006 TIP REPORT].
8. For example, Burma and Saudi Arabia were first included on the list at Tier 3 in 2001.
U.S. STATE DEP’T, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 12 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 TIP REPORT].
Burma has been ranked at Tier 3 on every subsequent report. Saudi Arabia, after a brief flirtation
with Tier 2 on the 2003 and 2004 TIP Reports, has rested comfortably at Tier 3 in each subsequent
TIP Report. U.S. STATE DEP’T, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 17 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 TIP
REPORT]; U.S. STATE DEP’T, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 21 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 TIP
REPORT]; U.S. STATE DEP’T, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 39 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 TIP
REPORT]; U.S. STATE DEP’T, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 42 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 TIP
REPORT]; 2006 TIP REPORT, supra note 7, at 46; 2007 TIP REPORT, supra note 7, at 42; 2008 TIP
REPORT, supra note 1, at 44.
9. The Group of Seven (G-7) is an international organization consisting of seven large industrialized countries (Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United
States). The organization coordinates the economic policy of its member states and, by virtue of
the strength of their economies, global economic policy. For example, the October 2008 meeting
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form the baseline standards for the international prevention of and fight
against money laundering by countries and banking and financial systems
and institutions, issued a list of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories
(NCCTs). The list named countries whose banking and financial laws and
regulations did not meet the standards set forth in the Forty Recommendations.10 The Initial NCCT Report included fifteen countries and territories;
six additional jurisdictions were named as NCCTs in the 2001 Report. In
late 2007, the FATF issued the 2006/2007 list of NCCTs.11 No countries or
territories remained on the list; all of the formerly noncompliant states and
territories are now compliant or their compliance is in the process of being
confirmed.12
The contrasting levels of compliance engendered by inclusion of individual countries on the two lists appear to indicate that the international
fight against money laundering is more successful than are the international
efforts to combat the traffic in human beings. This article therefore seeks to
explore whether the FATF’s international anti-money laundering regime
may serve as a useful model for international anti-trafficking efforts and
whether the institutional standards and methodologies of the anti-money
laundering regime can be adapted and successfully deployed in the fight
against trafficking in human beings.
I have asserted elsewhere that the dominant conceptual and legal
frameworks deployed to combat the trafficking in humans, including the
law enforcement framework, are inadequate.13 However, I have acknowledged the value of those frameworks even as I have advocated a more strucof the G-7 responded to the world financial and credit crisis, formulating a coordinated policy by
G-7 member states.
10. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, REPORT ON NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES 1 (2000) [hereinafter INITIAL NCCT REPORT]; FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, REVIEW TO IDENTIFY
NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES: INCREASING THE WORLDWIDE
EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING MEASURES 12 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 NCCT REPORT]. In two subsequent reports, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified countries
and territories that the organization would investigate and review in order to determine NonCooperative Country or Territory (NCCT) designation. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, REVIEW TO
IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES: INCREASING THE WORLDWIDE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING MEASURES 18–19 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 NCCT REPORT]; FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, REVIEW TO IDENTIFY NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES OR
TERRITORIES: INCREASING THE WORLDWIDE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING MEASURES 19–20 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 NCCT REPORT].
11. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, ANNUAL REVIEW OF NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES 2006–2007: EIGHTH NCCT REVIEW (2007) [hereinafter 2007 NCCT REPORT].
12. That is, within eight years, all the territories identified as an NCCT had taken steps to
comply with the standards of the Forty Recommendations, and had been investigated/monitored
and delisted. Only Myanmar is currently subject to monitoring. 2007 NCCT REPORT, supra note
11, at 5; see also supra note 8 (summarizing Myanmar’s/Burma’s response to the TIP Reports).
Both the names “Burma” and “Myanmar” are used in this article. The dual usage reflects references to “Myanmar” in FATF publications and to “Burma” in the TIP Reports.
13. See Karen E. Bravo, Exploring the Analogy Between Modern Trafficking in Humans and
the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 207, 240–43 (2007).
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tural assault on the trade.14 The international anti-money laundering model
analyzed here, if adapted to the international fight against human trafficking, would strengthen the implementation of existing frameworks, especially the already dominant law enforcement approach.
Prior to embarking on that analysis, the article will assess the extent to
which the anti-money laundering regime’s apparent success can be substantiated. In order to perform this assessment, while maintaining its focus on
the use of name-and-shame lists in the fight against trafficking, the article
compares and contrasts human trafficking and money laundering.15 In doing so, the article examines, among other things, the nature of the two illicit
markets, as well as the theoretical and legal frameworks used to understand
and combat these markets. In addition, the article analyzes the international
and domestic interests that are affected by the existence of and fight against
the markets. The analysis conducted here highlights how the international
system views and prioritizes the exploitation of monetary and financial systems in comparison with the exploitation of human persons. Additionally,
this analysis explores the effectiveness of different types of international
and transnational coordination in fighting global problems, including formulating, harmonizing, and enforcing international legal standards.
Part II describes and compares the trafficking in humans and the laundering of money, and contrasts the use and effectiveness of the two namingand-shaming lists deployed to combat them. Part III broadens the scope of
analysis to place the anti-money laundering and anti-human trafficking efforts, including the two lists, within the relevant historical and political contexts and assesses the effectiveness of the two regimes. Part IV discusses
the potential for and challenges to adapting the international anti-money
laundering model for deployment in the international efforts against human
trafficking. The article concludes that the principal challenge to adoption of
this course of action is the formation of international political will.
II. TWO GLOBAL PROBLEMS: LAUNDERING MONEY
AND TRAFFICKING IN HUMANS
A. Introduction
Both the human-to-human exploitation of trafficking in persons and
money laundering, the exploitation of legitimate financial and monetary
14. See Karen E. Bravo, Free Labor! A Labor Liberalization Solution to Modern Trafficking
in Humans, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. __ (forthcoming 2009).
15. The discussion and description of anti-money laundering efforts, which would be very
basic and of less interest to a scholar of money laundering, is directed to scholars of human
trafficking and anti-trafficking activists who may be less knowledgeable about the mechanisms
and institutions of the anti-money laundering model. As such, the descriptions of the FATF’s antimoney laundering efforts laid out in this article are more detailed than are the descriptions of the
international anti-trafficking efforts with which scholars of human trafficking and anti-trafficking
activists are more familiar.
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networks, have evoked responses from a variety of international actors—the
United Nations, the G-7, the Council of Europe, and powerful nations such
as the United States of America. Money laundering and human trafficking
share several characteristics. Both activities have been criminalized domestically and internationally. Both may take place solely within the domestic
sphere of individual nations or territories, but often exploit interstices in
domestic and international law in order to access transnational and transborder markets. The two are also linked at two stages of their operation: the
availability and use of money laundering is linked to the causes of human
trafficking; and, like profiteers from other predicate crimes, the trafficker in
human beings uses money laundering services to move proceeds and profits
into the legitimate economy.
1. Trafficking in Human Beings
Trafficking in human beings—the uncompensated exploitation, for
profit, of a human being—is often described as modern slavery. To extract
services and to trade the person, the trafficker in human beings exercises
control over the trafficked person not through legal ownership,16 but rather
through illegal use of physical force or coercion and/or the application of
psychological forms of coercion. The trafficked person is bought and sold,
and services, that is, sexual or other types of labor, are extracted from the
person with no or token compensation. The individual may be victimized in
order that the trafficker may profit from the services s/he will provide or
because the physical, racial, gender, age, or other attributes of that individual make him or her vulnerable to exploitation. The trafficked human is
targeted both as a provider of labor services that may be extracted and as an
item that is tradable and transportable and from which profit may be derived. Liability attaches to the trafficker, but not to the person subject to
trafficking, who, under international law, is to be treated as a victim by the
state in which s/he is located.17 However, the trafficked person may be subject to liability on independent grounds, depending on the activity in which
that person has been engaged, such as the voluntary crossing of nation-state
borders in violation of applicable immigration laws.
16. The prohibition against slavery has attained the status of a peremptory or jus cogens
norm under customary international law. See A. Yasmine Rassam, International Law and Contemporary Forms of Slavery: An Economic and Social Rights-Based Approach, 23 PENN. ST. INT’L L.
REV. 809, 810 (2005). Customary norms of international law which have attained the status of jus
cogens are nonderogable. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. n and reporters’ note 11 (1987). No country or territory legally sanctions the chattel ownership (that is, slavery) of human beings. However, the customs or practices
in some countries may produce exploitation that is experientially tantamount to slavery. For example, scholars have identified Mauritania as a state where slavery continues to exist. See, e.g.,
DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SLAVERY IN THE NEW WORLD
330 (2006).
17. See Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3, arts. 6–7 (respectively detailing protections that
State Parties should provide to victims of trafficking and providing that State Parties should con-
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The Trafficking Protocol defines human trafficking as
[T]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt
of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms
of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of
the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery,
servitude or the removal of organs[.]18
The Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in
Human Beings adopts the same definition.19
In contrast to these international instruments, the U.S. domestic statute,
the TVPA, identifies two types of trafficking that are distinguished by their
varying levels of ascribed severity. The TVPA defines “sex trafficking” as
“the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act.”20 According to the TVPA,
“severe forms of trafficking” are defined as:
(A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced
by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to
perform such act has not attained 18 years of age; or
(B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or
obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of
force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.21
The domestic definition employed by the United States is arguably as important as the definition provided by the Trafficking Protocol, since it is the
United States that has created and continues to maintain a list of foreign
countries (the TIP Report) that attempts to track those countries’ compliance with anti-trafficking obligations.22
sider the adoption of domestic legislation providing trafficking victims a right to remain, either
temporarily or permanently, in the receiving State).
18. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3, art. 3(a). The Trafficking Protocol is the first international instrument to define trafficking in persons.
19. Council of Europe, Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings and Its
Explanatory Report art. 4, May 15, 2005, C.E.T.S. 197 [hereinafter Council of Europe Trafficking
Convention], available at http://www.coe.int/t/dg2/trafficking/campaign/Docs/Convntn/
FSConv_en.asp#TopOfPage (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). The Convention, the first European treaty
in the field of human trafficking, was opened for signature on May 15, 2005. Id. On October 24,
2007, the Convention received its tenth ratification, triggering its entry into force on February 1,
2008. Id.
20. Trafficking Victims Protection Act § 103(9), 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9) (2006).
21. Id. § 7102(8).
22. See infra Part II.C. (regarding the framing of those obligations).
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2. Laundering Money
Through the laundering of money, an individual or entity attempts “the
conversion of criminal incomes into assets that cannot be traced back to the
underlying crime.”23 The purpose of laundering the proceeds and profits
from criminal activities is to allow the criminal to enjoy the fruits of that
activity outside the criminal sphere, that is, within the legitimate economy,
while at the same time disguising the criminal source of that money.24 The
money is and is not, simultaneously, the object of the targeted activity. The
would-be launderer already has obtained money and profits through the underlying criminal activities. That is, for the owner of the illegally obtained
money, profits already have been earned; the provider of laundering obtains
a service fee and perhaps other benefits from performing the service. Possession of the money itself evidences engagement in the underlying (or
predicate) criminal act. Concealment of the criminal origins allows the
owner to openly enjoy the funds.
The process of laundering money is “conventionally divided into three
phases: placement of funds derived from an illegal activity, layering of
those funds by passing them through many institutions and jurisdictions to
disguise their origin, and integration of the funds into an economy where
they appear to be legitimate.”25 Both the criminal owner of the dirty funds
and the service provider, whether natural or juridical, who participates in
the laundering activity, are referred to as money launderers. Both actors are
criminally liable.
B. Comparing and Linking Trafficking in Humans and Money
Laundering
While the laundering of money is the performance of an illicit service,
the trafficking in human beings is the buying, selling, and exploitation of a
person as an item of “merchandise”—a commodity that provides a service.
1. Comparing
An important difference is that while the trafficking of humans is regarded as malum in se (that is, evil by its very nature) because of the human
exploitation at its heart, as well as the disapprobation evoked by the consequent damages to individuals and societies, the laundering of money is
criminalized and disapproved because of the harms it may cause. In the
past, money laundering was regarded as an ill because it allowed the inte23. PETER REUTER & EDWIN M. TRUMAN, CHASING DIRTY MONEY: THE FIGHT AGAINST
MONEY LAUNDERING 1 (2004).
24. GUY STESSENS, MONEY LAUNDERING: A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
MODEL 83 (2000).
25. REUTER & TRUMAN, supra note 23, at 3. For a more detailed discussion of money laundering techniques, see id. at 27–40.
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gration of criminal proceeds into the legitimate economy, (1) allowing the
criminal to enjoy the fruits of criminal activity, and (2) hiding the evidence
of the illegal and illicit sources of the funds. As a result, money laundering
increases the existing incentives to commit crimes and makes it more difficult for law enforcement to apprehend and the legal system to punish perpetrators of the underlying criminal act(s). Through legislation, the laundering
of money has been criminalized.26 As a result, the provider of money laundering services, even if unconnected to the commission of predicate criminal offenses, now faces criminal liability.
The two phenomena share some similarities. For example, governments, organizations, and scholars of the two activities have great difficulty
in estimating their size and scale.27 Further, the difficulty of identifying the
activities due to the mutability (from legal to illegal) of the trade service or
goods serves to disguise both activities from outsiders. Both money and
humans, as the subject of money laundering and the trafficking of persons,
present challenges to prohibition and law enforcement due to their fungibility and ease of concealment. Money may become illicit due to the manner
in which it was obtained28 and the mechanisms to which it is subjected to
cleanse it of its origins. However, money by itself does not readily provide
evidence of its illegal source. It moves in and out of legality and illegality,
licitness and illicitness, based on the legal systems and processes and social
norms applied to it. Superficially, money appears to be legitimate and may
easily blend with funds that are produced by legal activities.
Similarly, trafficked persons may be easily blended with other human
beings into legitimate industries. Only the application of legal rules and
definitions to the circumstances of the individual, particularly with respect
to the nature and extent of the control exercised over the individual, distinguishes the trafficked person from a person who is exploited in other ways
but not trafficked,29 or, indeed, one who is appropriately or inappropriately
26. Most jurisdictions now criminalize money laundering itself, not only the underlying
crime(s), and, indeed, the Forty Recommendations of the FATF demand that they do so. FIN.
ACTION TASK FORCE, THE FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2003), available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/document/28/0,3343,en_32250379_32236930_33658140_1_1_1_1,00.html [hereinafter
FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS]. For an example of anti-money laundering legislation, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956.
27. See, e.g., 2006 GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 65 (discussing challenges of data collection with respect to the trafficking of humans); Kamala Kempadoo, Introduction: From Moral
Panic to Global Justice; Changing Perspectives on Trafficking, in TRAFFICKING AND PROSTITUTION RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON MIGRATION, SEX WORK, AND HUMAN RIGHTS vii, xx
(Kamala Kempadoo et al. eds., 2005) (“Accurate figures about trafficking do not exist . . . .”); see
also Jackie Johnson & Desmond Lim, Money Laundering: Has the Financial Action Task Force
Made a Difference?, 10 J. FIN. CRIME 7, 7 (2002) (asserting, with respect to money laundering,
that “judging the size of the problem is virtually impossible, given its secretive nature”).
28. For example, drug trafficking proceeds, bribery and corruption, fraudulent activity, or
theft.
29. For example, through underpayment or nonpayment of wages.
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targeted for prosecution.30 As a result of the fungibility and ease of concealment, to an extraordinary extent, laundered money and trafficked persons
present significantly similar challenges to those attempting to identify and
prevent these proscribed activities.
Even more difficulties are presented by transborder movements of
money and people, so that harmonization of standards of identification,
criminalization, and punishment become crucial. The dealers in human
cargo and dirty money take advantage of the interstices and lacunae between domestic and international law, as well as among different domestic
legal regimes. For example, the operative definitions of “human trafficking”
and “money laundering” may change, so that movement across a border
may eliminate the criminality of the activity, risk of criminal prosecution,
and/or the scope of the applicable punishment. As a result, the creation of
transnational systems to deal with money laundering and human trafficking
activities is crucial to curtailing these activities.
The two activities can also be compared with respect to other attributes—the level of sophistication of the crimes, the nature of the victim and
victimization on which it is based, and societal attitudes toward the activity.
Money laundering appears to be the more sophisticated crime, requiring the
interconnection of financial systems and technical expertise in the mechanics and functioning of domestic and international financial and banking institutions.31 In order to cleanse the dirty money, the successful launderer
must be familiar with (and indeed, master) and weave the money in and out
of divergent potentially and actually applicable laws and regulations, sophisticated financial instruments, and reporting and monitoring requirements. As such, money laundering may be more dependent on its
connection to legitimate institutions and enterprises than is the traffic in
humans.
The trafficking in human beings appears to be less sophisticated. The
trafficker must create schemes to bring individuals under his or her control,
and must dominate the individual to maintain that control, either through
psychological or physical means. More sophisticated tools and methods of
control and service extraction may be required, depending on the location
and nature of the trafficked person’s exploitation and/or the necessity of
crossing borders. For example, while traffickers may use sophisticated
schemes to engineer the issuance of valid travel documents, they may also
use simpler schemes entailing corruption of border control and/or immigration officials. Once dominated, the trafficked person may be hidden in the
30. For example, domestic prostituted women are typically prosecuted as wrongdoers with
insufficient thought devoted to the question of whether they are trafficking victims.
31. See, e.g., Alison S. Bachus, Note, From Drugs to Terrorism: The Focus Shifts in the
International Fight Against Money Laundering After September 11, 2001, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 835, 845–46 (2004) (describing various money laundering methodologies and the variety of financial instruments and institutions involved).
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open as a foreign agricultural worker, restaurant employee, or prostituted
dancer who is concealed behind cultural and language barriers. If exploited
in a domestic (household) worker/service situation, the trafficked person
may be completely concealed.32
The two activities also differ with respect to the identity of the victim
and nature of the victimization. With respect to the trafficking of humans, at
first glance it appears that it is the individual trafficked person alone who is
victimized. However, broadening the scope of analysis reveals that families
as well as societies of origin and destination also are victims.33 Money laundering, on the other hand, appears to be a victimless crime since the predicate crimes have already been completed. However, the availability of
mechanisms that facilitate the enjoyment of the fruits of the predicate
crimes and the concealment of the evidence of commission of those crimes
serves as an incentive and context for the commission of additional predicate crimes. The laundering of the funds may be viewed as the last stage in
the series of acts that constitute the perpetration of the crime.34 The victims
of the underlying crimes may be unable to recover monetary compensation
32. That is, the trafficked person may never meet anyone other than his/her trafficker, or may
be concealed behind the role of (subservient) domestic servant. See Lisa Frank, Couple Convicted
of Harboring Maid, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 26, 2006, available at http://www.jsonline.
com/story/index.aspx?id=428675.
33. See, e.g., Bravo, supra note 13, at 276–77 (discussing damage caused to origin and destination societies by the traffic in humans).
34. That the apparent victimlessness of money laundering is a mere illusion was brought
home in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001. Global fears about the use of international financial and banking networks led to expansion of the FATF’s mandate and to UN Security
Council resolutions against terrorist financing, among other things. UN Security Council Resolution 1267 provides for the establishment of the committee to oversee the implementation of sanctions against Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. S.C. Res. 1267, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct.
15, 1999). Several subsequent Security Council Resolutions expanded the sanctions regime to
cover individuals and entities associated with Al-Qaida, the Taliban, and Osama bin Laden worldwide. The Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee, General Information on the Work of the
Committee, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/information.shtml (last visited Jan. 17, 2009).
The committee is now known as the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, and it is made
up of all fifteen members of the Security Council. Id. The main function of the Committee is to
maintain the Consolidated List, a list of individuals and entities associated with Al-Qaida, the
Taliban, and Osama bin Laden. Id. Member states propose individuals and entities for listing and
provide detailed statements in support of their proposals. The Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions
Committee, Fact Sheet on Listing, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/fact_sheet_listing.shtml
(last visited Jan. 17, 2009). The Committee makes final listing decisions by consensus. Id. There
are currently approximately five hundred names on the list. The Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions
Committee, General Information on the Work of the Committee, http://www.un.org/sc/ committees/1267/information.shtml (last visited Jan. 17, 2009). Individuals and entities on the Consolidated List face mandatory sanctions. The Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee, The
Consolidated List, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/consolist.shtml (last visited Jan. 17,
2009). Through multiple Security Council resolutions, states are required to freeze the assets of,
prevent the entry into or transit through their territories by, and prevent the supply of arms to
individuals and entities appearing on the list. Id. For a brief discussion of potential human and
civil rights implications of this regime, see infra note 324.
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because the full extent of the proceeds of the wrongdoing is hidden.35 In
addition, the mingling of dirty funds with legitimate funds may damage and
pervert the domestic and international financial and banking systems of host
societies.36
The apparent victimlessness of money laundering mutes the outrage of
society. The efforts against money laundering, notably its investigation and
monitoring, which appear to be more bloodless and technical pursuits, are
the creature of technocrats, banking experts, financial institutions, and governments. In contrast, the average person is viscerally affected by images
and narratives about the trafficking of human beings. The human-to-human
exploitation of the trafficking in persons thus elicits more societal interest
and greater involvement on the part of civil society actors.
As a result of these differences, nation-state authorities inveigh publicly, in emotional tones and evocative rhetoric, against the traffic in
humans.37 In contrast, the fight against money laundering is conducted quietly in intergovernmental spheres, with input by technically adept bankers,
financiers, accountants, and other experts. The civil society represented in
anti-money laundering circles is a thin and largely invisible sliver of the
broader society.38
2. Linking
Money laundering is intimately linked to the foundations of the trafficking in human beings. Firstly, economic and political instability are
among the push factors identified as a cause of the vulnerability and movement of trafficked persons from countries of origin.39 To the extent that
corrupt leaders and/or governments are able to capture national resources
35. For example, money stolen by kleptocratic leaders and governments may be impossible
to locate and thus cannot be returned to the nations from which it was stolen.
36. See Bachus, supra note 31, at 838–41 (discussing the harmful effects of money
laundering).
37. For example, in an address to the UN General Assembly, President George W. Bush
stated,
We must show new energy in fighting back an old evil. Nearly two centuries after the
abolition of the transatlantic slave trade, and more than a century after slavery was
officially ended in its last strongholds, the trade in human beings for any purpose must
not be allowed to thrive in our time.
President George W. Bush, Speech Before the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 23, 2003)
(transcript available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/09/23/sprj.irq.bush.transcript/index.html).
38. For example, the list of international organizations that have been granted the status of
FATF observers is dominated by intergovernmental and professional organizations. They include
the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Customs Organization. FIN. ACTION TASK
FORCE, Members & Observers, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379_32236869_1
_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Members & Observers].
39. See, e.g., Luz Estella Nagle, Selling Souls: The Effect of Globalization on Human Trafficking and Forced Servitude, 26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 131, 137–39 (2008) (discussing some causes of
the trafficking in humans).
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for personal benefit and to launder and hide the proceeds of such theft in
transborder financial institutions, money laundering contributes to the poverty and instability that makes nationals of those countries vulnerable to
exploitation.40
The second link between the two ills is the utilization of domestic and
transborder money laundering services by the trafficker in human beings.
Human trafficking is one of the predicate crimes served by the laundering
of money.41 The incentive of the traffickers is the same as the incentive of
perpetrators of other underlying crimes—the trafficker seeks to hide the
illegitimate source of the proceeds and to enjoy the proceeds within the
legitimate economy.
C. Name-and-Shame Tactics
Both activities have stimulated international and individual nationstate responses. A central feature of both the international fight against
human trafficking and the international anti-money laundering regime is the
use of lists as a naming-and-shaming device that is aimed at encouraging or
compelling nation-states to comply with the issued standards. The list
deployed in the anti-money laundering effort is the NCCT list, issued by the
FATF, an international intergovernmental group with limited membership.
The FATF received a specific anti-money laundering mandate, and possesses a limited, but extendible, term of existence.42 The anti-trafficking
naming-and-shaming list is the United States’ congressionally mandated,
annual TIP Report.43 The standards used were formulated by the U.S.
Congress.
The two lists vary with respect to the methodologies and mechanisms
underlying inclusion and placement of individual countries on the lists, the
sources and application of the criteria against which jurisdictions are measured, the information-gathering methodologies, as well as their effectiveness. The divergent responses of states to their placement on the lists may
result from the differing methodologies and may indicate the greater success of the international anti-money laundering regime compared with the
international anti-trafficking regime.
40. See, e.g., SHELDON X. ZHANG, SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS: ALL
ROADS LEAD TO AMERICA 111–14 (2007) (discussing links among corruption, poverty, and human
trafficking).
41. Recommendation 1 of the Forty Recommendations requires that, in determining which
crimes constitute predicate offenses for the crime of money laundering, countries “should at a
minimum include a range of offences within each of the designated categories of offences.”
FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 26. The Glossary to the Forty Recommendations includes
“trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling” among the designated categories of offenses. Id.
42. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, REVISED MANDATE 2008–2012, 2 (2008), available at http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/3/32/40433653.pdf.
43. See 2008 TIP REPORT, supra note 1.
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1. Anti-Human Trafficking
The two most significant legal instruments in the state-level international efforts against human trafficking are the UN Trafficking Protocol and
the U.S. TVPA.44 The central purposes of both instruments include the prevention of trafficking, the protection of victims, and the prosecution of traffickers. To those ends, both instruments adopt broad definitions of
trafficking45 and the component activities encompassing trafficking are
criminalized.
a. U.S. Extraterritorial Efforts: The TIP Report
Deeply disturbed by the congressional findings and testimony before
Congress regarding the rise and spread of the trafficking in human beings,
U.S. federal legislators took a determined anti-trafficking stance.46 In addition to the main thrust of the TVPA—the criminalization of trafficking
within the United States, provisions for prevention of the traffic, and protec44. Opened for signature and signed into law only a month apart in 2000, the two instruments
share many characteristics, although some potential conflicts are apparent. Other international
instruments that specifically respond to the expansion in the trafficking of humans are more regional in scope. See, e.g., Council of Europe Trafficking Convention, supra note 19. On October
24, 2007, the Convention received its tenth ratification, triggering its entry into force on February
1, 2008. Id. The Convention is the first European treaty in the field of human trafficking, and it is
focused on protecting victims, prosecuting traffickers, preventing trafficking, and setting up a
system to monitor the implementation of the Convention. Id. The Convention adopts the definition
of trafficking from the UN Trafficking Protocol, but employs language that is more mandatory in
its formulation of the anti-trafficking obligations of States Parties than is the UN Trafficking
Protocol. Id. For example, where the Protocol asks that states protect the privacy and identity of
victims “[i]n appropriate cases and to the extent possible under its domestic law,” Trafficking
Protocol, supra note 3, art. 6(1), the Convention requires that “[e]ach [state] party shall protect the
private life and identity of victims.” Council of Europe Trafficking Convention, supra note 19, art.
11. The Protocol only requires that States “consider implementing measures to provide for the
physical, psychological and social recovery of victims,” which may include housing, counseling,
medical care, and employment or education. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3, art. 6(3). In contrast, the Convention requires that each State adopt measures necessary to assist victims in their
physical, psychological, and social recovery, which at a minimum must include appropriate accommodations, emergency medical treatment, translation and interpretation services, counseling,
and access to education for children. Council of Europe Trafficking Convention, supra note 19,
art. 12. However, it is yet too early to assess the long-term impact of this regional instrument.
Other regional anti-trafficking instruments include the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution, http://www.humantrafficking.org/uploads/publications/SAARC_Convention
_on_Trafficking___Prostitution.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2009), and two Organization of American States instruments: the American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa
Rica,” http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-32.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2009), and the
1994 Inter-American Convention on International Traffic in Minors, http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/Treaties/b-57.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
45. See definitions supra Part II.A.
46. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act § 102, 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(21) (2006) (finding,
among other things, that “[t]rafficking of persons is an evil requiring concerted and vigorous
action by countries of origin, transit or destination”).
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tion of and benefits for specified trafficked persons,47 U.S. legislators put in
place a system aimed at combating the trade outside the borders of the
United States.48 The annual report on trafficking submitted to Congress by
the Secretary of State and the threat of U.S. sanctions have bolstered the
intended extraterritorial effect of the United States’ anti-trafficking
regime.49
Section 110 (Actions Against Governments Failing to Meet Minimum
Standards) requires that the U.S. Secretary of State produce and submit, by
June 1 of each year, a report on the anti-trafficking efforts of foreign governments.50 The provision requires that the report include three lists:
(A) a list of those countries, if any, to which the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking are applicable and
whose governments fully comply with such standards;
(B) a list of those countries, if any, to which the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking are applicable and
whose governments do not yet fully comply with such standards
but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance; and
(C) a list of those countries, if any, to which the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking are applicable and
whose governments do not fully comply with such standards and
are not making significant efforts to bring themselves into
compliance.51
A fourth category, the Tier 2 Watch List, was created by the 2003
reauthorization of the TVPA.52 The provision reads, in pertinent part:
Countries that have been [ranked at Tier 2] pursuant to the current
annual report, where—
(I) the absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is significantly increasing;
(II) there is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons from the
47. Id. § 106, 22 U.S.C. § 7104 (prevention of trafficking); id. § 107, 22 U.S.C. § 7105 (protection and assistance for victims of trafficking); id. § 111, 22 U.S.C. § 7108 (actions against
significant traffickers in persons); id. § 112, 22 U.S.C. § 7109 (strengthening prosecution and
punishment of traffickers).
48. See id. § 102(b)(24), 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(24) (noting, among other things, that “[t]he
United States must work bilaterally and multilaterally to abolish the trafficking industry by taking
steps to promote cooperation among countries linked together by international trafficking routes”).
49. As discussed infra Part III.E.1, the annual TIP Reports have prodded many countries to
adopt anti-trafficking legislation. In addition, the information gathered in the report has been a
boon to anti-trafficking advocates and to scholars of human trafficking. See ZHANG, supra note
40, at 110.
50. Trafficking Victims Protection Act § 110(b)(1), 22 U.S.C. § 7107(b)(1) (2006).
51. Id. § 110, 22 U.S.C. § 7107(b)(1)(A)–(C). The three lists have evolved into the Tier 1
and Tier 2 watch list, and Tier 3 rankings of countries used in the annual TIP Reports.
52. See Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–193,
§ 6(e), 117 Stat. 2875 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7107(b) (2006)).

R

\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-1\UST109.txt

2008]

unknown

Seq: 16

15-JUN-09

FOLLOW THE MONEY?

12:35

153

previous year, including increased investigations, prosecutions
and convictions of trafficking crimes, increased assistance to victims, and decreasing evidence of complicity in severe forms of
trafficking by government officials; or
(III) the determination that a country is making significant
efforts to bring themselves into compliance with minimum standards was based on commitments by the country to take additional future steps over the next year.53
Section 108 (Minimum Standards for the Elimination of Trafficking)
of the TVPA54 further delineates the minimum standards applicable to
countries of “origin, transit or destination for victims of severe forms of
trafficking”55 in order to eliminate trafficking. The provision specifies the
nature and some substantive characteristics of anti-trafficking legislation
that should be adopted by such countries,56 as well as the criteria to be used
in evaluating the efforts of the referenced countries.57
Subparagraph (b)(3) of Article 110 of the TVPA further outlines the
criteria to be used by the Secretary of State in determining whether a country is “making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with [the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking].”58 Those criteria include the extent of the occurrence of severe forms of trafficking in that
country, the extent of governmental noncompliance with the standards set
forth in the TVPA, and the nature of the measures which might reasonably
be undertaken to bring the country into compliance with those standards.59
Section 109 of the TVPA60 (Assistance to Foreign Countries to Meet
Minimum Standards) authorizes the President of the United States to provide to foreign countries that fail to meet the minimum standards specified
in the TVPA assistance for programs, projects, and activities designed to
meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. Conversely,
Section 110 of the TVPA requires that, within ninety days of the submission of an annual report on or after January 1, 2003,61 the President of the
United States is required to submit notification to “the appropriate congressional committees” of his determinations with respect to the treatment of
53. Id. § 110, 22 U.S.C. § 7107(b)(3)(A)(iii).
54. Id. § 108, 22 U.S.C. § 7106.
55. Id.
56. Id. (including, among other things, the standard of intent to be applied in criminalizing an
act of human trafficking).
57. Id. (specifying prosecution of traffickers, provision of assistance to victims, monitoring
of immigration and emigration patterns, and cooperation with transborder law enforcement, such
as extradition).
58. Id. § 110(b)(3), 22 U.S.C. § 7107(b)(3)(A)(iii)(III).
59. Trafficking Victims Protection Act § 110(b)(3)(A)–(C), 22 U.S.C. § 7107(b)(3)(A)–(C)
(2006).
60. Id. § 109, 22 U.S.C. § 2152d.
61. Id. § 110(c), 22 U.S.C. § 7107(c) (specifying “not less than 45 or more than 90 days after
the submission, on or after January 1, 2003, of an annual report”).
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each country which “does not comply with the minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking [and] is not making significant efforts to bring
itself into compliance.” Section 110(d) provides that, among other things,
the president may withhold from such countries nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related assistance, continue such assistance if such continuation is in
the national interest of the United States, and/or exercise waiver authority
and continue or initiate assistance.62 Specifically, the President has the discretion to withhold nonhumanitarian, non-trade-related assistance, all multilateral assistance to a country described in paragraph (1)(B), or one or more
programs, projects, or activities of such assistance.63 As a result of the
availability of presidential discretion, a ranking of Tier 3 on the annual TIP
Report (signifying lack of compliance with the standards and inadequate
efforts to do so) does not automatically trigger the implementation of mechanisms to encourage compliance with the minimal standards.64
62. Id. § 110(d)(1), (3), (5), 22 U.S.C. § 7107(d)(1), (3), (5).
63. Id. § 110(d)(5)(A), 22 U.S.C. § 7107(d)(5)(A).
64. On September 9, 2003, President George W. Bush issued the Presidential Determination
with Respect to Foreign Governments’ Efforts Regarding Trafficking in Persons, Presidential Determination No. 2003-35, 3 C.F.R. 332–333 (2003), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 7107 [hereinafter
Presidential Determination 2003]. In this determination, pursuant to section 110(d)(1)(A)(ii) of the
TVPA, the president imposed sanctions on educational and cultural exchange programs for the
fiscal year 2004 with respect to Burma, Cuba, Liberia, North Korea, and Sudan. Id. That year,
each of these five countries were categorized as Tier 3 countries in the TIP Report. 2003 TIP
REPORT, supra note 8. The president determined that, pursuant to section 110(d)(3) of the TVPA,
the remaining countries categorized as Tier 3 countries in the TIP Report that year came into
compliance with the minimum standards or were making significant efforts to bring themselves
into compliance, and therefore, sanctions were not imposed upon their governments. Presidential
Determination 2003. These countries included Belize, Bosnia, the Dominican Republic, Georgia,
Greece, Haiti, Kazakhstan, Suriname, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. Id. Moreover, the president determined that, pursuant to the TVPA’s waiver authority under section 110(d)(4), certain multilateral
assistance to Sudan was necessary to implement a peace accord and to Liberia would promote the
purposes of the TVPA or was otherwise in the national interest of the United States. Id.
On September 10, 2004, President George W. Bush issued a Presidential Determination
whereby, pursuant to section 110(d)(1)(A)(i) of the TVPA, the president imposed sanctions on
nonhumanitarian, non-trade-related foreign assistance to the governments of Equatorial Guinea
and Venezuela for the fiscal year 2005. Presidential Determination with Respect to Foreign Governments’ Efforts Regarding Trafficking in Persons, Presidential Determination No. 2004-46, 3
C.F.R. 288–289 (2004), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 7107. The president also imposed sanctions on
educational and cultural exchange programs for the fiscal year 2005, pursuant to section
110(d)(1)(A)(ii) of the TVPA, with respect to Burma, Cuba, North Korea, and Sudan. Id. The
president determined that the remaining countries categorized as Tier 3 countries in the TIP Report that year, specifically Bangladesh, Ecuador, Guyana, and Sierra Leone, came into compliance
with the minimum standards or were making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance, and therefore, sanctions were not imposed upon their governments. Id. In accordance with
the Act’s waiver authority, the president determined that certain assistance to Equatorial Guinea,
Sudan, and Venezuela would promote the purposes of the TVPA or was otherwise in the national
interest of the United States. Id.
On September 21, 2005, President Bush issued a Presidential Determination whereby pursuant to section 110(d)(1)(A)(i) of the TVPA, the president imposed sanctions on nonhumanitarian,
non-trade-related foreign assistance to the governments of Cambodia and Venezuela for the fiscal
year 2006. Presidential Determination with Respect to Foreign Governments’ Efforts Regarding
Trafficking in Persons, Presidential Determination No. 2004-46, 3 C.F.R. 268–269 (2005), re-
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Further, Section 104 (Annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices) of the TVPA requires that annual country reports describing the
human rights records of foreign country recipients of U.S. aid include descriptions of “the nature and extent of severe forms of trafficking in persons, as defined [by U.S. legislation], in each foreign country.”65 The report
is required to specify, among other things, the preventative measures
against human trafficking undertaken by foreign governments, the assistance to victims of trafficking, and the extent of those governments’ cooperation with other governments in anti-human trafficking activities.66
printed in 22 U.S.C. § 7107. The president also imposed sanctions on educational and cultural
exchange programs for the fiscal year 2006, pursuant to section 110(d)(1)(A)(ii) of the TVPA,
with respect to Burma, Cuba, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Id. The president
determined that, pursuant to section 110(d)(3) of the TVPA, the remaining countries categorized
as Tier 3 countries in the TIP Report that year came into compliance with the minimum standards
or were making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance, and therefore, sanctions
were not imposed upon their governments. Id. These countries included Bolivia, Jamaica, Qatar,
Sudan, Togo, and the United Arab Emirates. Id. However, in accordance with the Act’s waiver
authority, the president determined that provision of certain bilateral and multilateral assistance to
the governments of Cambodia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia would promote the
purposes of the TVPA or was otherwise in the national interest of the United States. Id.
On September 27, 2006, President Bush imposed sanctions on nonhumanitarian, non-traderelated foreign assistance to the governments of Burma, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe pursuant to
section 110(d)(1)(A)(i) of the TVPA for the fiscal year 2007. Presidential Determination with
Respect to Foreign Governments’ Efforts Regarding Trafficking in Persons, Presidential Determination No. 2006-25, 3 C.F.R. 312–314 (2006), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 7107. The president also
imposed sanctions on educational and cultural exchange programs for the fiscal year 2007, pursuant to section 110(d)(1)(A)(ii) of the TVPA, with respect to Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, and Syria. Id. The president determined that, pursuant to section 110(d)(3),
Belize and Laos came into compliance with the minimum standards or are making significant
efforts to bring themselves into compliance, and therefore, sanctions were not imposed upon their
governments. Id. However, in accordance with the Act’s waiver authority, the president determined that provision of certain bilateral and multilateral assistance to the governments of Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe would promote the purposes
of the TVPA or was otherwise in the national interest of the United States. Id.
Finally, on October 18, 2007, President Bush issued a Presidential Determination whereby
sanctions were imposed on nonhumanitarian, non-trade-related foreign assistance to the governments of Burma, Syria, and Venezuela pursuant to section 110(d)(1)(A)(i) of the TVPA for the
fiscal year 2008. Presidential Determination with Respect to Foreign Governments’ Efforts Regarding Trafficking in Persons, Presidential Determination No. 2008-4, 3 C.F.R. 355–358 (2007),
reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 7107. The president also imposed sanctions on educational and cultural
exchange programs for the fiscal year 2008, pursuant to section 110(d)(1)(A)(ii) of the TVPA,
with respect to Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Iran. Id. The president
determined that, pursuant to section 110(d)(3) of the TVPA, Equatorial Guinea and Kuwait came
into compliance with the minimum standards or are making significant efforts to bring themselves
into compliance, and therefore, sanctions were not imposed upon their governments. Id. And, in
accordance with the Act’s waiver authority, the president determined that provision of certain
bilateral and multilateral assistance to the governments of Algeria, Bahrain, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, Iran, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Sudan, Syria, Uzbekistan and Venezuela, would promote the purposes of the TVPA or was otherwise in the national interest of the United States. Id.
65. § 104(A), 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (amending section 116(f) and adding a new provision to
section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961).
66. See id.
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b. International Efforts Under the UN Trafficking Protocol
The approach adopted by the parties to the UN Trafficking Protocol
differs significantly from that of the United States. The Protocol’s approach
can be described as a voluntary67 and nonenforceable self-reporting and cooperation model that eschews naming and shaming.
Article 32 of the Transnational Crime Convention provides that a
“Conference of the Parties to the Convention is hereby established to improve the capacity of States Parties to combat transnational organized crime
and to promote and review the implementation of this Convention.”68 Article 37 of the Convention and Article 1 of the Trafficking Protocol provide
that the provisions of the Convention apply, mutatis mutandis, to the Protocol.69 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the
custodian70 of the UN Trafficking Protocol supplementing the
Convention.71
At its first session, which took place June 28 through July 9, 2004, the
Conference of the Parties to the Convention adopted its Rules of Procedure,72 which lay out the structure, representation, and decision-making
procedures of the Conference. Each State Party to the Convention has one
representative in the Conference,73 and with prior written notification, any
state or regional economic integration organization signatory to the Convention may participate in the Conference as an observer.74 Nonsignatory
states, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernment organizations
67. The approach is voluntary in the sense that states affirmatively consent to accede to or to
sign and ratify the UN Transnational Crime Convention and the Trafficking Protocol.
68. Transnational Crime Convention, supra note 2, art. 32.
69. Id.; Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3, art. 1.
70. The result of the 1997 merger of the United Nations Drug Control Programme and the
Center for International Crime Prevention, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) assists UN Member States in combating crimes such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism. See UNODC, About UNODC, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/aboutunodc/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
71. UNODC, UNODC on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling, http://www.unodc.
org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
72. Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Vienna, June 28–July 8, 2004, Report of the Conference of the Parties to the
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime on its First Session, available
at http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/COP/session1/V0587363e.pdf [hereinafter
First Session Report]. These rules provide that the first three sessions of the Conference will be
held annually, and that subsequent sessions will be held at least biennially. UNDOC, RULES OF
PROCEDURE FOR THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 2 (2005), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/
ctoccop_2006/05-85142_ebook-E.pdf [hereinafter RULES OF PROCEDURE].
73. RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 72, at 5. “When the Conference undertakes deliberations concerning a Protocol, any recommendation or decision pertaining solely to the Protocol
shall be taken only by the States Parties to that Protocol present and voting.” Id. at 23.
74. Id. at 5. These organizations may attend meetings of the Conference, make statements at
the meetings, receive documents from and submit documents to the Conference, and participate in
the deliberative process. The organizations may take part in the decision-making process by voting, but they may only cast the number of votes equal to the number of their member states that
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may also participate as observers with the permission of the Conference,
but in a more limited capacity.75 The Rules of Procedure provide that the
States Parties shall make every effort to make decisions by consensus, but
that decisions will be taken by vote if consensus cannot be reached.76 Each
State Party has one vote, and decisions on matters of substance, including
amendments to the Convention, must be taken by a two-thirds majority.77
At the opening of each session, a president, eight vice-presidents, and
a rapporteur are elected to serve as the officers of that session, holding their
positions until the election of new officers at the next session.78 Following
each session, the Conference publishes a report on the deliberations held
and the decisions made. In the First Session Report, the Conference published its decision to carry out the requirements of Article 32 of the Convention with respect to the Trafficking Protocol by adopting a “programme
of work” on the Protocol.79 Pursuant to this program, the Conference undertook to consider the adaptation of national legislation necessary to conform
to the Protocol, to examine the criminalization and legislation difficulties
encountered by countries implementing the Protocol, enhance international
cooperation, and exchange views and experience with regard to the protection of victims and preventive measures.80 To these ends, the conference
secretariat collected and continues to collect information from States Parties
to the Protocol, using a questionnaire drafted by the parties to the Protocol.81 The First Session Report “[r]equests States parties to respond
promptly to the questionnaire circulated by the Secretariat.”82 The secretariat then submits an analytical report to the next session of the Conference
based on the information gathered.
The secretariat presented the first analytical report at the second session of the Conference.83 At that time, the secretariat had received reare parties to the Convention, and these organizations may not exercise their right to vote if their
member countries have done so and vice versa. Id. at 17–18.
75. Id. at 6–7.
76. Id. at 17–18.
77. Id. at 18. However, any such vote in favor of amendment would require ratification by
the parties. Decisions regarding budgetary issues require unanimity, and decisions on matters of
procedure are taken by a simple majority. Id.
78. Id. at 8–9. The Secretariat to the Conference is responsible for receiving, translating, and
distributing documents and reports and decisions of the Conference. Id. at 11–12.
79. First Session Report, supra note 72, at 5.
80. Id.
81. Id. The questionnaire seeks information on each country’s compliance with the definition, criminalization, and international cooperation requirements under the Protocol, and inquires
whether the country needs assistance in meeting these obligations. Conference of the Parties to the
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, July 28, 2004, Questionnaire
on Implementation of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime, available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/ctoccop_2005/quest_1-5_e.pdf.
82. First Session Report, supra note 72, at 5.
83. Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Vienna, Oct. 10–21, 2005, Review of the Implementation of the Protocol to Pre-
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sponses from fifty-six states: thirty-seven were parties to the Protocol,
thirteen were signatories, and six were nonsignatories.84 This means that 43
percent of States Parties had responded.85
Despite the fact that the First Analytical Report to the Conference specifically named jurisdictions that had not complied with their obligations
under the Protocol, the Second Session Report eschewed naming and shaming, simply “[noting] with concern that a number of States parties had not
yet complied with their obligations under the Protocol,” and “[u]rged those
States parties which had not complied with their obligations under the Protocol to rectify that situation as soon as possible and to provide information
on the measures taken to do so to the secretariat.”86 The Second Session
Report also “[n]oted with concern that the analytical report prepared by the
Secretariat was based on responses of only 43 per cent of States parties to
the Protocol” and “[u]rged States parties to respond promptly to the ques-

vent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Sept. 14,
2005), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/ctoccop_2005/V0588039e.pdf [hereinafter First Analytical Report]. The report contained a summary of the responses to the questionnaires, highlighting the progress made and the difficulties faced by countries in implementing the Protocol. Id. at
5. The First Analytical Report noted that most reporting countries had abided by the Protocol’s
mandates regarding the definition and criminalization of trafficking, though further work to promote consistency of such legislation was necessary. Id. at 6. The report also named the countries
whose policies deviated from the requirements of the Protocol, and noted that many countries had
requested technical assistance in implementing the Protocol. Id. at 12. The report also called on
more states to respond to the questionnaire. Id. at 14.
84. Id. at 4–5. The responding States Parties were Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, France, Jamaica, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Myanmar, Namibia, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Romania, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, and Turkey. The responding signatories were Austria, the Czech
Republic, the Dominican Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, the Republic of Moldova,
Sri Lanka, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, the United Republic of
Tanzania, and the United States. The responding nonparties were Afghanistan, Angola, China,
Honduras, Kuwait, and Malaysia. Id. at 15.
85. Id. at 5.
86. Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Vienna, Oct. 10–21, 2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties to the United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime on its Second Session (Dec. 1, 2005),
available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/ctoccop_2005/V0590521e.pdf [hereinafter Second Session
Report].
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tionnaire.”87 The Report also laid out the “programme of work” for the
2006 third session of the Conference.88
In fulfillment of the mandate of the Second Session Report, the secretariat presented the Second Analytical Report to the Third Session of the
Conference.89 In the Second Analytical Report, the secretariat reported that
it had received fourteen additional questionnaire responses: ten were parties
to the Protocol, three were signatories, and one was a nonsignatory.90 Together with the States Parties that had already responded, and taking into
account the new accessions and ratifications of the Protocol, this brought
the total responding States Parties up to 47 percent. Once again, the updated
report noted that most responding countries were fulfilling their obligations
under the Convention with regard to the criminalization and definition of
human trafficking. The report also identified the states whose policies fell
short.91 Again, despite the fact that the secretariat presented the Conference
with the information necessary to specifically identify individual countries
87. Id. at 7–8. States Parties are obligated under the Convention to provide information to the
secretariat. In order to achieve those specific objectives, “the Conference of the Parties shall acquire the necessary knowledge of the measures taken by States parties in implementing the Convention and the difficulties encountered by them in doing so through information provided by
them.” Transnational Crime Convention, supra note 2, art. 32, ¶ 4. Furthermore, the Convention
requires States Parties to provide the Conference with information on their programmes, plans and
practices, as well as legislative and administrative measures to implement the Convention. Id. ¶ 5;
First Analytical Report, supra note 83, at 3. The Second Session Report also asked the secretariat
to continue to compile information from the questionnaires and to present another analytical report
at the next session, and asked countries that had already responded to the questionnaire to update
these responses as necessary. Second Session Report, supra note 86, at 5.
88. Second Session Report, supra note 86, at 8. The program included consideration of matters related to assistance to victims of trafficking, repatriation of victims, measures related to
border measures and documentation, and the possibility of cooperation with the International Labour Organization.
89. Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Vienna, Oct. 10–21, 2005, Review of the Implementation of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime: Updated
Information Based on Additional Responses Received from States for the First Reporting Cycle
(Aug. 8, 2006), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/ctoccop_2006/V0656230e.pdf [hereinafter
Second Analytical Report].
90. Id. at 5. The States Parties were Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bulgaria, Colombia, Egypt,
Nicaragua, Serbia and Montenegro, Tajikistan, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
The signatories to the Protocol were Ireland, Italy, and Thailand, and the nonsignatory was Kazakhstan. Id.
91. Id. at 7. The secretariat also presented a report that discussed the updates and clarifications provided by countries identified as noncompliant with certain obligations under the Protocol
in the First Analytical Report. See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime, Vienna, Oct. 9–18, 2006, Implementation of the United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and the Protocol Against the
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air and Programme of Work of the Conference of the
Parties Thereto: Clarification from States Parties on Non-Compliance for the First Reporting
Cycle (Aug. 9, 2006), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/ctoccop_2006/V0656278e.pdf.

R

\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-1\UST109.txt

160

unknown

Seq: 23

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

15-JUN-09

12:35

[Vol. 6:1

as noncompliant, the Third Session Report refrained from doing so,92 and
was very similar in substance to the Second Session Report.93 The fourth
session of the Conference took place in Vienna on October 8 through 17,
2008.94
In summation, despite some indication that nonreporting may correlate
with failure to comply with the obligations undertaken under the Trafficking Protocol, the Conference of the Parties under the Transnational Crime
Convention and the Trafficking Protocol avoids naming and shaming States
Parties who have not fulfilled the self-reporting agreed to by the Conference. In addition, no sanctioning mechanisms have been adopted that are
aimed at encouraging or coercing compliance of those States Parties.
2. Anti-Money Laundering: The NCCT List
The international fight against money laundering is led by the FATF,
an independent intergovernmental body whose purpose is to develop and
promote international standards and policies to combat money laundering
and terrorist financing.95 The FATF was established in 1989 at the G-7
Summit in Paris as a result of the professed need to internationalize the
fight against drug trafficking—then perceived as a key source of laundered
money.96 The priorities of the FATF are to ensure global action to combat
money laundering and terrorist financing as well as concrete implementation of the Forty Recommendations,97 which the organization first issued in
1990.98 These Recommendations have become the international standard
for combating money laundering.99 In fact, the Forty Recommendations
have been referred to as “[t]he crown jewel of soft law” on money
laundering.100
92. Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Vienna, Oct. 9–18, 2006, Report of the Conference of the Parties to the United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime on its Third Session (Dec. 22, 2006),
available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/ctoccop_2006/V0659538e.pdf [hereinafter Third Session
Report].
93. The report urged countries to respond to the questionnaires sent out by the secretariat,
noted that most countries that had responded were fulfilling their obligations under the Protocol,
and urged states to take further action pursuant to the Protocol.
94. UNODC, Highlights, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ngos/news.html (last visited Feb.
11, 2009).
95. FATF, About the FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379_32236836
_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2009) [hereinafter About the FATF].
96. Id. The G-7 countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. The 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which included a pledge to stop money laundering, served as
the impetus for the creation of the FATF. Bachus, supra note 31, at 848; PETER ANDREAS &
ETHAN NADELMANN, POLICING THE GLOBE: CRIMINALIZATION AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 147–49 (2006).
97. About the FATF, supra note 95.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. STESSENS, supra note 24, at 17.
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The Recommendations were revised in 1996 to respond to changes in
money laundering techniques.101 Further, in response to the September 11
terrorist attacks, the FATF expanded its mandate to encompass the issue of
terrorist financing,102 resulting in the organization’s issuance of the Eight
Special Recommendations.103 The FATF standards again were updated in
June 2003 in order to keep up with emerging money laundering tactics.104
Finally, a ninth Special Recommendation was added in October 2004 and,
overall, the current standards are referred to as the 40+9 Recommendations
(Forty Recommendations).105
The FATF monitors countries’ progress in implementing the antimoney laundering and terrorist financing measures (starting with member
countries), studies new money laundering and terrorist financing techniques
and countermeasures, and promotes the implementation of the Forty Recommendations globally.106 The anti-money laundering regime is characterized by a name-and-shame list supported by a sanctioning mechanism
which may include financial shunning.
In 1999, the FATF introduced its NCCT initiative, which was created
to ensure that all countries adopt anti-money laundering measures.107 The
project was intended to force nonmembers of the FATF with anti-money
laundering systems deemed to be deficient by the FATF to adopt new antimoney laundering methodologies. The FATF achieved this goal by adopting a “name-and-shame” mechanism—the publication of a list of noncompliant jurisdictions. The project also encouraged FATF members to take
actions to convince NCCTs of the importance of adopting such
legislation.108
The FATF first outlined the criteria for identifying NCCTs and the
actions that would be deployed to encourage their compliance in the 2000
NCCT Report.109 These criteria consist of a range of detrimental rules and
practices within and by individual jurisdictions that obstruct international
cooperation against money laundering.110 There is no specific criterion that
101. About the FATF, supra note 95.
102. Id.; see also Bachus, supra note 31, at 859–60.
103. About the FATF, supra note 95.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Jared Wessel, The Financial Action Task Force: A Study in Balancing Sovereignty with
Equality in Global Administrative Law, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 169, 174 (2006).
108. Id. at 175.
109. INITIAL NCCT REPORT, supra note 10.
110. Id. ¶ 8. These detrimental rules can be found in an NCCT’s financial and other regulatory
systems (especially those related to customer and account identification), its rules regarding international administrative and judicial cooperation, and the resources the jurisdiction has available
for preventing, detecting, and repressing money laundering. Id.
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can serve as a litmus test; rather, a jurisdiction should be evaluated based on
the entirety of its efforts to combat money laundering.111
The 2000 NCCT Report stated that public identification of NCCTs
should be the first step in encouraging anti-money laundering action by
noncompliant jurisdictions.112 Once a jurisdiction was identified as an
NCCT and placed on the list, the FATF takes further steps to convince that
jurisdiction to comply. First, the FATF and its members were encouraged to
open a dialogue with the NCCT in order to provide advice and technical
cooperation to aid the country in implementing its own anti-money laundering measures.113 Also, actions may be taken by other multilateral organizations, such as the G-7, the OECD, and the IMF. The FATF would also
consider applying Recommendation 21 (which encourages financial institutions to pay “special attention” to transactions with the offending country)
to the nonmember jurisdiction that refuses to cure the anti-money laundering deficiencies identified by the FATF.114 Finally, FATF member jurisdictions should apply countermeasures designed to protect their own
economies against laundered money.115 The suggested countermeasures
range from imposing enhanced customer identification requirements by financial institutions in FATF member states with respect to transactions with
individuals or entities in the NCCT, up to and including conditioning, re111. Id. ¶ 35.
112. Id. ¶ 38. Possible NCCTs are identified for further investigation in one of two ways: by
being named by an FATF member based on recent difficulty in enforcing anti-money laundering
procedures or by review by a regional ad hoc group. Wessel, supra note 107, at 175–76. There are
four regional review groups (the Americas, Asia/Pacific, Europe, and Africa and the Middle East)
which meet regularly to prepare for NCCT discussions. Also, FATF membership should have no
effect on the final listing decision. Id. Once a country has been identified for further investigation,
the ad hoc group “undertakes a fact-finding review of the jurisdiction in question with the assistance of other FATF members, as well as the Secretariat or the relevant [FSRB].” Id. at 176; see
also INITIAL NCCT REPORT, supra note 10, ¶ 39. Jurisdictions under review are not necessarily
placed on the NCCT list, and they are entitled to certain procedural requirements. Wessel, supra
note 107, at 176. These countries are informed of their initial status and they are given the opportunity to comment on the ad hoc group’s report before it is submitted to the FATF Plenary. Id.;
see also INITIAL NCCT REPORT, supra note 10, ¶ 41. Further, a dialogue takes place between the
FATF and the prospective NCCT prior to the final decision for the purpose of negotiating alternatives to listing. Wessel, supra note 107, at 176. Ultimately, the FATF Plenary decides whether or
not to list a country. Id.
113. INITIAL NCCT REPORT, supra note 10, ¶¶ 45–46.
114. Id. ¶ 48. Recommendation 21 of the Forty Recommendations requires that
[f]inancial institutions should give special attention to business relationships and transactions with persons, including companies and financial institutions, from countries
which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations. Whenever these
transactions have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, their background and
purpose should, as far as possible, be examined, the findings established in writing, and
be available to help competent authorities. Where such a country continues not to apply
or insufficiently applies the FATF Recommendations, countries should be able to apply
appropriate countermeasures.
FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 26, ¶ 21 (emphasis added).
115. INITIAL NCCT REPORT, supra note 10, ¶ 50. The Initial NCCT Report lays out the recommended countermeasures under the heading “Countermeasures designed to protect economies
against money of unlawful origin.” Id.
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stricting, or even prohibiting financial transactions with NCCTs (that is,
financial shunning).116 The Report notes that collective action by FATF
members is preferable, but that individual FATF members can ultimately
make decisions regarding countermeasures in their individual capacities.
The FATF has issued a total of eight NCCT reports since the Initial
NCCT Report.117 The first round of investigations spanned two NCCT Reports (the June 2000 and June 2001 Reports) and identified nearly every
NCCT that has ever been named.118 NCCT reports divide the jurisdictions
that have been investigated into categories: NCCTs and non-NCCTs.119
NCCTs are grouped into (1) those that have made progress since the last
report; (2) those that have not made adequate progress since the last report;
and (3) those subject to countermeasures.120 Jurisdictions falling into the
last category are subject not only to the application of Recommendation 21
“special attention” (as to all NCCTs), but the FATF further recommends
that FATF members take proportionate, gradual countermeasures against
these jurisdictions.121 The non-NCCTs discussed in NCCT reports include
jurisdictions that have been investigated during the preceding year and determined to be sufficiently compliant with FATF standards to avoid listing.122 NCCT reports also discuss the jurisdictions that have been removed
from the NCCT list since the issuance of the last report, as well as the
jurisdictions that are subject to enhanced monitoring.123
Once a jurisdiction has been listed as an NCCT, it will typically submit
an implementation plan as a predicate step toward delisting.124 In order to
determine whether a jurisdiction will be removed from the NCCT list, the
116. Id. ¶¶ 49–52.
117. The Initial NCCT Report did not identify NCCTs. Instead, the report simply laid out the
criteria for identifying NCCTs and the appropriate actions to be taken by the FATF and its member countries in order to encourage compliance. Under the heading “Steps to Encourage Constructive Anti-Money Laundering Action,” the report described in some detail the methods the FATF
would use to exact compliance from nonmember countries. Initially, the report describes the first
method of exacting compliance, the NCCT listing procedure. Id. ¶¶ 35–54.
118. In fact, only two additional NCCTs have been identified since the first round of investigations in 2000 and 2001; Grenada and Ukraine were both identified as NCCTs at plenary meetings in September 2001 after another round of reviews. See 2002 NCCT REPORT, supra note 10, at
1. Because the 2001 NCCT Report was issued in June, these countries were not reflected in the
NCCT reports until the June 2002 Report was issued. Similarly, many countries have been delisted and/or removed from the list of countries subject to monitoring at plenary meetings taking
place in the interim between NCCT reports. When this is the case, the change is reflected in the
next report.
119. See 2001 NCCT REPORT, supra note 10; see also 2002 NCCT REPORT, supra note 10.
120. Id.
121. FATF, ANNUAL REVIEW OF NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES ¶ 17 (2003)
[hereinafter 2003 NCCT REPORT].
122. Some sufficiently compliant countries were listed in the June 2000, 2001, and 2002
NCCT Reports.
123. Myanmar is the only country that continued to be subject to monitoring. 2007 NCCT
REPORT, supra note 11.
124. Wessel, supra note 107, at 177.
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FATF assesses progress made by the jurisdiction and discusses it at the
plenary.125 Before a jurisdiction is delisted, the FATF must be satisfied that
the jurisdiction has instituted a comprehensive and effective anti-money
laundering system and has addressed the previously identified
deficiencies.126
Reinstatement. The FATF has listed the steps (implementation of legislative and regulatory reforms) that NCCTs must take in order to be delisted. The steps to be taken are as follows:
1. The NCCT must enact laws and regulations that comply
with international standards127 to address the deficiencies that led
to the NCCT’s initial listing.
2. Once these reforms have been made, the NCCT must submit an implementation plan to the FATF, which should address
specifically the filing of suspicious transaction reports, analysis
and follow-up on such reports, money laundering investigation
procedures, monitoring of financial institutions, international cooperation, and the provision of financial and human resources.
3. The appropriate regional review group will review the
implementation. The regional review groups will respond to the
NCCT and report regularly on their progress.128
4. At the initiative of the regional review group, the FATF
should make an on-site visit to the NCCT to confirm effective
implementation of the reforms.
5. The review group reports progress at FATF meetings, and
when the review group decides that the NCCT “has taken sufficient steps to ensure continued effective implementation of the
reforms,” it will recommend delisting to the FATF Plenary, and
the decision will be made based on the plenary’s “collective
judgment.”
6. If a country is delisted, the FATF President sends a letter
to the NCCT reminding the NCCT that delisting does not mean
that the money laundering regime is perfect, describing remaining
concerns regarding the country and the necessity of monitoring,
and proposing a monitoring mechanism which includes submission of regular implementation reports and a follow-up assessment visit.129
According to the FATF, the policy “enables the FATF to achieve equal
and objective treatment among NCCT jurisdictions.”130 Following delisting, former NCCTs are subject to increased monitoring by both the FATF
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 26.
128. There are four regional review groups: Americas, Asia/Pacific, Europe, and Africa and
the Middle East. Wessel, supra note 107, at 175–76.
129. 2007 NCCT REPORT, supra note 11, annex 2, ¶ 6.
130. Id.
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and the relevant FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs), which can last for
years.131 The monitoring focuses on the jurisdiction’s progress against the
implementation plans, the specific concerns raised in the progress reports,
and the experience of FATF members.132 All jurisdictions are subject to
monitoring immediately following delisting, but the length of time a jurisdiction remains subject to monitoring varies.133 The reactions of jurisdictions that have been included on the NCCT lists evidence a high level of
compliance with the international anti-money laundering standards of the
FATF.
In cases where the NCCT has failed to make adequate progress in addressing the deficiencies in its implementation of the FATF standards discussed above, the FATF may recommend the application of
countermeasures in addition to the application of Recommendation 21.134
The application of such countermeasures should be “gradual, proportionate
and flexible regarding their means and taken in concerted action.”135 The
suggested countermeasures begin with requiring FATF members to fully
implement customer identification measures and to forbid institutions from
opening accounts if the applicant fails to supply valid documentation as to
the true owner of the account.136 Next, the report invokes the language of
Recommendation 21, stating that FATF members should adopt specific requirements requiring financial institutions to pay “special attention” to
transactions with individuals or entities within the NCCT.137 Finally, the
report provides that FATF members should consider “whether it is desirable
and feasible to condition, restrict, target, or even prohibit financial transactions” with the NCCTs. The FATF has recommended that only three countries be subject to countermeasures.138
The sanctions formally imposed by the FATF against NCCTs in the
form of Recommendation 21 and countermeasures are not the only consequences of listing: the NCCT list also can “signal the market that a particular area is a haven for illicit behavior.”139 This means that inclusion on the
131. Id. at 12–13. There are eight FSRBs. FSRBs operate like mini-FATFs, performing the
same functions as the FATF on a smaller, regional scale. Bachus, supra note 31, at 853–54. The
FSRBs are discussed in more detail infra Part III.C.
132. 2007 NCCT REPORT, supra note 11, at 12–13.
133. For more detailed information, see the eight NCCT Reports, available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/findDocument/0,3354,en_32250379_32237267_1_32247550_1_1_1,00.html and http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/document/4/0,3343,en_32250379_32236992_33916420_1_1_1_1,00.html.
134. 2003 NCCT REPORT, supra note 121, ¶ 17.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. The United States has adopted such requirements in 31 C.F.R. § 103.18, which “increases the cost of doing business in the jurisdiction via the red-tape of additional reporting requirements.” Wessel, supra note 107, at 174.
138. The countries subject to countermeasures are Nauru (from December 2001 until October
2004), Myanmar (from November 2003 until October 2004), and Ukraine (from December 2002
until February 2003). 2007 NCCT REPORT, supra note 11.
139. Wessel, supra note 107, at 172.
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NCCT list may have an impact on a listed jurisdiction’s interactions even
with other non-FATF jurisdictions.
3. Contrasting Apparent Effectiveness
A cursory review of the two naming-and-shaming lists reveals the
greater apparent effectiveness of the anti-money laundering regime. After
the first two rounds of reviews in 2000 and 2001, a total of twenty-three
jurisdictions were identified as NCCTs or potential NCCTs.140 As a result
of the potentially harmful reputational effects, most of those jurisdictions
immediately took action to improve their anti-money laundering regimes.141
Annual NCCT reviews have taken place every year since the first NCCTs
were named, and the number of listed jurisdictions has declined steadily
during that time.142 In the most recent NCCT review, the last remaining
NCCTs were officially delisted.143
On the other hand, the first TIP Report, issued in July 2001, included a
total of seventy foreign countries, twelve of which were ranked as Tier 1
(indicating full compliance with the minimum standards of the TVPA) and
twenty-three of which were ranked as Tier 3. After eight iterations of the
report (the latest TIP Report was issued in June 2008), twenty-nine of 170
countries were ranked as Tier 1. Seventy-one countries (the largest group)
were ranked as Tier 2, forty countries were included on the Tier 2 watch
list, and fourteen countries were ranked as Tier 3. Thus, the number of Tier
3 countries decreased by over one-third, from twenty-three countries in
2001 to the current fourteen,144 and the number of compliant countries has
almost tripled over the eight-year period.
However, the number of noncompliant countries has ballooned with
the increase in the number of countries described and evaluated in the report. Further, a study of the movements of individual countries among the
tiers appears to indicate camaraderie and comfort, and little apprehension of
sanctioning, on the part of the increasing number of countries listed and
continuing for years as Tier 2 and on the Tier 2 watch list. A number of
such countries have remained for years at Tier 3 of the annual TIP Report
with few signs of any intention to comply.145 In contrast, with respect to the
FATF’s anti-money laundering regime, even the most isolationist countries,
140. 2007 NCCT REPORT, supra note 11, ¶ 6.
141. Id. ¶ 7.
142. Id. at 13.
143. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. The last NCCTs were Nigeria and Myanmar. However, Myanmar remains
subject to monitoring. Id.
144. This change in number does not capture the movement upward in the ranking of several
countries originally listed at Tier 3. See 2008 TIP REPORT, supra note 1, at 44.
145. The 2008 TIP REPORT ranks the following countries at Tier 3: Algeria, Burma (Myanmar), Cuba, Fiji, Iran, Kuwait, Moldova, North Korea, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Sudan, and Syria. North Korea, Cuba, and Saudi Arabia each has been listed at Tier 3 for
a number of years. Id.
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such as Myanmar, eventually comply with the standards in order to be removed from the NCCT list and to be freed from the FATF’s
countermeasures.146
As contrasted with the FATF’s NCCT list, the question arises about
the effectiveness of the U.S. TIP Report as a name-and-shame device that
encourages adherence to effective minimum standards. The question centers
on (1) the value and effectiveness of the minimum standards underlying
country placement on the list;147 (2) the information, mechanisms, and
methodologies used for determining placement on the list; (3) the sanctioning device utilized to encourage compliance by foreign countries; and (4)
the ethos of all-inclusiveness, where countries seem to be added to the list
each year.148
At the same time, questions also arise as to whether the apparently
greater success of the FATF’s NCCT list does indeed indicate the broader
dissemination and acceptance of anti-money laundering norms. This seemingly broader dissemination and acceptance of anti-money laundering
norms is striking in light of the contrasting international law status of the
international instruments implementing the international fight against
money laundering and human trafficking. The Forty Recommendations of
the FATF are categorized as soft law,149 issued by an intergovernmental
organization with limited membership. On the other hand, the UN Trafficking Protocol is an international treaty, entered into by 124150 UN Member
States in order to undertake the fight against a form of activity that violates
the ius cogens prohibition against the enslavement of humans. How and
why did and could soft law norms become more effective and binding (or
evoke more compliance by nation-states) than is an international instrument
that creates law and implements a peremptory norm of international law?
146. 2007 NCCT REPORT, supra note 11, ¶ 2.
147. Does the United States’ extraterritorial imposition of its own domestically constructed
norms serve to undermine the international norms agreed to and encapsulated in the UN Trafficking Protocol?
148. For example, five countries were added to the list in the most recent TIP Report. See
2008 TIP REPORT, supra note 1, at 44. In contrast, the NCCT list includes only noncompliant
jurisdictions, and jurisdictions are included after a thorough examination and opportunity to comply. The shame and threat of sanction arising from inclusion on the NCCT list appears to be
greater than the analogous reaction to the TIP Report.
149. International law scholars Jeffrey Dunoff and his coauthors describe soft law as “declared
norms of conduct understood as legally nonbinding by those accepting the norms.” Further, with
respect to soft law instruments, they note that they
assume innumerable forms, ranging from declarations of international organizations, to
industry codes of conduct, to experts’ reports. Soft law instruments though not enforceable by legal sanction, are often framed in legal language and in many respects may
exhibit an authority comparable to that of treaties or custom.
JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 32 (2002).
150. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3 (there are 124 parties and 117 signatories to the Protocol); Transnational Crime Convention, supra note 2 (there are 147 parties and 147 signatories to
the Convention).
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In order to answer such questions, Part III will review aspects of the
historical and political contexts of the international reactions against money
laundering and the trafficking of human beings. Among the considerations
and factors to be weighed are the stronger political interest of cohesive and
powerful groups of states in combating money laundering as opposed to
fighting against human trafficking; the availability and commitment of resources toward the fight against money laundering; and a more coordinated
anti-money laundering effort by the FATF with more effective norm building, dissemination, and penetration.
III. TWO INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS
A. Introduction
In order to evaluate the relative success of the FATF’s international
anti-money laundering fight and the combined effect of the United States’
and United Nations’ international efforts against human trafficking, this article will now broaden the scope of its analysis beyond the apparently
greater effectiveness of the FATF’s name-and-shame device (the NCCT
list) as compared with the United States’ own device (the TIP Reports) and
the reports and analyses issued by the Transnational Crime Convention’s
Conference of the Parties.
The article therefore explores the reasons for the greater apparent effectiveness of the anti-money laundering regime, that is, whether and how
the institutional, standard-setting, information-gathering, and enforcement
framework of which the NCCT list is a part contributes to its apparent success. Further, if that seeming effectiveness stands up to scrutiny, and the
reasons for that effectiveness lie with particular aspects of the institutional
framework, is it possible to adapt those elements in the fight against human
trafficking?
This part therefore summarizes and compares the purposes of the two
regimes, the institutions created or involved in the international anti-human
trafficking151 and anti-money laundering efforts, the information-gathering
and standard-setting methodologies, the criteria for evaluating jurisdictions,
and the nature and extent of civil society input, if any.
B. The Anti-Human Trafficking Regime
The international fight against the trafficking in human beings might
be said to be centuries old. According to such a perspective, the battle begins with the British abolition of its transatlantic slave trade in 1807 and the
British Navy’s policing of the high seas in an attempt to end the trading of
151. However, the analysis conducted here will concentrate on the institutional reactions of
the United States, at that time (in 2000) the sole superpower in a unipolar world, and of the
Member States of the United Nations.
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slaves by other nations.152 The fight continues through the abolition of the
African slave trade and the network of antislavery instruments spearheaded
by Great Britain,153 through the white slavery panic of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century, and the adoption by the League of Nations of
anti-white slavery conventions.154 The international efforts against the enslavement of humans continued with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the adoption, incorporation, and updating by the
United Nations (the League of Nations’ successor) of preexisting antislavery treaties and conventions.155 Yet, despite these efforts, the continued viability of the decades-old conventions, and the consensus regarding the ius
cogens status of the prohibition against human enslavement, the trafficking
in human beings has reemerged and expanded in the late twentieth and
early twenty-first centuries.156
The reemergence and growth of this form of human-to-human exploitation has evoked strong reactions from the public, civil society, national governments, and international institutions. Civil society responses,
in particular the role of women’s advocacy groups in the international
sphere, have played a crucial part in the development of the international
efforts against human trafficking. As stated earlier, the Trafficking Protocol
and the U.S. TVPA are the most influential anti-trafficking instruments in
the international sphere.157 Both instruments include provisions aimed at
protection of victims, including both efforts to prevent trafficking and to
confer benefits and protection on victims of trafficking once they are identified (and rescued from their exploitative situations).158
152. See, e.g., SUZANNE MIERS, SLAVERY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE EVOLUTION OF A
GLOBAL PROBLEM 15–19 (2003).
153. Id. at 14–17 (describing Britain’s network of bilateral treaties).
154. International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, May 18, 1904,
35 Stat. 1979, 1 L.N.T.S. 83; International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave
Traffic, May 4, 1910, 211 Consol. T.S. 45, 103 B.F.S.P. 244; International Convention on the
Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, Sept. 30, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S. 416; International
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age, Oct. 11, 1933, 150 L.N.T.S.
431.
155. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the
Prostitution of Others, Dec. 2, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 271 (consolidating the foregoing treaties); see
Stephanie Farrior, The International Law on Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution:
Making It Live Up to Its Potential, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 213, 216–23 (1997). Other antislavery
international instruments include the Slavery Convention of 1926, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183,
60 L.N.T.S. 253; the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Apr. 30, 1957, 266 U.N.T.S. 40; and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316
(Mar. 23, 1976).
156. It may more accurately be said that the traffic has emerged into public consciousness, but
has continued in existence throughout the intervening periods despite many ardent efforts against
it.
157. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
158. See discussion supra Part II.A.1, Part II.C.1.
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The international efforts to combat trafficking are characterized by the
dominance of the law enforcement perspective and a contradictory setting
of low minimum applicable standards, as well as soft or nonexistent enforcement mechanisms. Further, despite eloquent anti-trafficking rhetoric,
there is little mandatory coordination and cooperation to eradicate the
exploitation.
Institutional Framework
The institutional frameworks of the anti-trafficking efforts influence
the methodologies that can be deployed in the fight; they also illuminate the
priorities of the States Parties with respect to the struggle. The Trafficking
Protocol does not create a new, separate agency or other body to police and/
or monitor trafficking activities. Instead, as a protocol to the UN Transnational Crime Convention, the Conference of the Parties created by that instrument applies with respect to reporting by States Parties to the
Protocol.159 States Parties’ compliance with required reporting provisions
has been less than optimal.160
The UNODC is the custodian of the Transnational Crime Convention.161 As custodian, the UNODC manages the Global Initiative to Fight
Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT) in cooperation with the International Labour Organization, the International Organization for Migration, the United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).162 Launched on March 26, 2007, UN.GIFT is an
initiative that was formed for the purpose of coordinating the global fight
against human trafficking on the basis of the UN Trafficking Protocol. Its
mission is
to mobilize state and non-state actors to eradicate human trafficking by reducing both the vulnerability of potential victims and the
demand for exploitation in all its forms; ensuring adequate protection and support to those who fall victim; and supporting the effi159. See discussion supra Part II.
160. See discussion supra Part II.
161. That is, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime [hereinafter UNODC] maintains up-to-date
records of accessions and ratifications of the Transnational Crime Convention and its protocols.
See UNODC, UNODC Treaties, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/index.html (last visited
Feb. 11, 2009).
162. UNODC, ANNUAL REPORT 2008: COVERING ACTIVITIES IN 2007, at 27 (2008), available
at http://www.unodc.org/documents/about-unodc/AR08_WEB.pdf. The United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking [hereinafter UN.GIFT] also partners with many other UN
entities, international organizations, NGOs, businesses, civil society, academic groups, and individuals (particularly celebrities), all with the purpose of combining different efforts and resources
to fight human trafficking.
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cient prosecution of the criminals involved, while respecting the
fundamental human rights of all persons.163
The UNODC also proposed the Global Programme Against Trafficking in
Human Beings (GPAT) in order to bring to the foreground the involvement
of organized crime groups in smuggling and human trafficking and to promote the development of effective criminal justice-related responses.164 The
work of GPAT is underpinned by the Transnational Crime Convention and
the Trafficking Protocol.165
Other entities within the UN are also involved in monitoring and combating human trafficking, and in giving aid to victims of the exploitation.
These include the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Trafficking. At its
sixtieth session, the Commission on Human Rights adopted decision 2004/
110 in which it appointed a special rapporteur on trafficking in persons,
especially women and children, to focus on the human rights aspects of
trafficking in persons.166 The Commission also requested that the special
rapporteur cooperate with relevant UN bodies, regional organizations, and
victims and their representatives.167 The special rapporteur’s mandate is as
follows:
a) Takes action on violations committed against trafficked
persons and on situations in which there has been a failure to
protect their human rights;
b) Undertakes country visits in order to study the situation
in situ and formulate recommendations to prevent and or combat
trafficking and protect the human rights of its victims in specific
countries and/or regions;
c) Submits annual reports on the activities of the
mandate.168
The special rapporteur is independent of the UNDOC and the Conference of
the Parties to the Convention.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is perhaps the
most important non-UN international organization engaged in the fight
163. UN.GIFT, About UN.GIFT, http://www.ungift.org/ungift/en/about/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2009). In carrying out this mission, UN.GIFT seeks to increase awareness of human
trafficking, to promote effective responses, to build capacity of state and nonstate actors (particularly by providing technical assistance), and to foster joint action against human trafficking.
UN.GIFT also conducts research in order to create a knowledge base and formulate effective antitrafficking strategies. UN.GIFT, Goals, http://www.ungift.org/ungift/en/about/goals.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
164. UNODC, GLOBAL PROGRAMME AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS: AN OUTLINE
FOR ACTION 3 (1999), available at http://www.uncjin.org/CICP/traff_e.pdf.
165. UNODC, UNODC on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling, http://www.unodc.
org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
166. Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially in Women and Children, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/trafficking/index.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
167. Id.
168. Id.
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against human trafficking.169 It is an independent intergovernmental organization formed in 1951 out of the chaos and displacement of Western Europe
following the Second World War.170 The IOM was mandated to help European governments identify resettlement countries for migrants uprooted by
the war. The organization later “broadened its scope to become the leading
international agency working with governments and civil society to advance
the understanding of migration issues, encourage social and economic development through migration, and uphold the human dignity and well-being
of migrants.”171 The reports generated by the IOM and the UN Special Rapporteur, as well as the reports of the UNODC and UN.GIFT publications172
have contributed substantially to knowledge about, and the international
fight against, human trafficking.
In contrast to the Trafficking Protocol, the U.S. TVPA formed a new
domestic institutional framework to combat human trafficking. The TVPA
created the Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking,173
and authorized the Secretary of State to establish an Office to Monitor and
Combat Trafficking.174 The primary purpose of the Office is to support the
Interagency Task Force and to assist the Secretary of State in carrying out
the purposes of the Act.175 Other obligations include working with NGOs
involved in anti-trafficking activities, trafficked persons, and others affected
by trafficking in humans.176 The impact of the information gathering and

169. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Counter-Trafficking, http://www.iom.
int/jahia/page748.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2009). The IOM has implemented almost five hundred projects in eighty-five countries, and has provided assistance to approximately fifteen thousand trafficked persons. Id.
170. IOM, History, http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/lang/en/pid/11 (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., UN.GIFT, MULTI-AGENCY SYNOPSIS OF MANDATES AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES
RELATED TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING (2008), available at http://www.ungift.org/docs/ungift/pdf/
knowledge/Multy-Agency%20Synopsis.pdf (discussing the anti-trafficking mandates and efforts
of the founding members of UN.GIFT and other organizations); UN.GIFT, THE VIENNA FORUM
REPORT: A WAY FORWARD TO COMBAT HUMAN TRAFFICKING (2008), available at http://
www.ungift.org/docs/ungift/pdf/vf/ebook2.pdf (describing the discussions and activities that took
place at the Feb. 13 and 15, 2008 Vienna Forum to Fight Human Trafficking). UN.GIFT also
publishes information gathered from its research on human trafficking. See UN.GIFT, HUMAN
TRAFFICKING: AN OVERVIEW (2008), available at http://www.ungift.org/docs/ungift/pdf/knowledge/ebook.pdf. The organization has also published a number of best practices reports. UN.GIFT,
Best Practices Reports, http://www.ungift.org/ungift/knowledge/practices.html (last visited Feb.
11, 2009).
173. Trafficking Victims Protection Act § 105, 22 U.S.C. § 7103 (2006). Members of the task
force, to be appointed by the President, include the Secretary of State, the administrator of the
U.S. Agency for International Development, the Attorney General, the director of the CIA, the
Secretary of Labor, as well as others. Id. § 105(b), 22 U.S.C. § 7103(b).
174. Id. § 105(e), 22 U.S.C. § 7103(e).
175. Id.
176. Id.
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reporting represented by the annual TIP Report has extended the extraterritorial effect of the efforts of these domestic U.S. institutions.177
The international anti-trafficking efforts are centered on information
gathering, monitoring, and reporting. However, the effectiveness of the UN
bodies’ focus on coordinated, cooperative monitoring and reporting to stimulate state action against human trafficking appears to be unclear.178 Other
than the prospect of sanctions arising from a country’s ranking on the U.S.
TIP Report,179 there appears to be no anti-trafficking enforcement mechanisms directed at individual states whether or not those states are parties to
the Trafficking Protocol. As a result, the United States appears to occupy
the field of global anti-human trafficking standard setting and enforcement.
C. The Anti-Money Laundering Regime
The international anti-money laundering regime coordinated and managed by the FATF is characterized by participatory expert-driven standard
setting; high level intergovernmental cooperation;180 effective sanctions;
coordinated activity by the rest of the international community against
noncompliant entities; the proliferation of regional FATFs; as well as cooperation by a variety of other international financial institutions, such as the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund.181
The United States’ first anti-money laundering legislation was the
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.182 With the passage of time, the U.S. perspective favoring anti-money laundering initiatives as a mechanism that could
effectively locate the proceeds from drug traffickers and lead to more successful prosecutions of those traffickers became more widespread.183 The
internationalization of U.S. anti-drug trafficking efforts culminated in the
1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho177. For example, the effect has been extended through norm dissemination. This is especially
the case since the U.S. standards are supported by the threat of the imposition of sanctions.
178. While, as of September 26, 2008, 124 states have signed and ratified the Trafficking
Protocol, and 117 states have signed and are in the process of ratification, Trafficking Protocol,
supra note 3, the failure of 53 percent of states to submit reports to the Conference of the Parties,
see, e.g., Second Analytical Report, supra note 89, at 5, and the years-long lingering of several
states on the U.S. TIP Report’s Tier 2 and Tier 2 watch list indicate a lack of serious engagement
with the issue by national governments.
179. See discussion supra Part II. The application of the unilateral sanctions has lacked the
automaticity that might have made the prospect of application of the sanctions more real. Id.
180. REUTER & TRUMAN, supra note 23, at 81.
181. Members & Observers, supra note 38.
182. U.S. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114–1124, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1951–1959 (1970). Later anti-money laundering legislation includes the Kerry Amendment to
the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (extending the international
reach of the U.S. domestic anti-money laundering regime). ANDREAS & NADELMANN, supra note
92, at 148–49.
183. ANDREAS & NADELMANN, supra note 92, at 147–49.
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tropic Substances.184 Although some individual states had already criminalized money laundering on the domestic level, it was this instrument that
sparked coordinated international anti-money laundering efforts.
The purpose of anti-money laundering efforts is the identification and
confiscation of the proceeds of the underlying predicate crimes. By locating
the funds and confiscating them, law enforcement and state authorities can
strengthen criminal prosecutions of accused suspects, identify sources of
compensation for crime victims, and locate and secure, through confiscation, additional funds for law enforcement activities through forfeiture proceedings.185 Because the standard of proof in civil forfeiture proceedings is
only “by a preponderance of the evidence” and not the criminal standard of
proof of “beyond a reasonable doubt,” there is an additional benefit. Law
enforcement may disrupt money laundering operations through civil forfeiture proceedings with less proof than might be required in a criminal proceeding.186 The primary purpose of anti-money laundering efforts,
however, is to disturb the incentive structure that underlies participation in
criminal activities.187 At the same time, anti-money laundering efforts seek
to protect legitimate financial networks from the corruptive effects of the
tainted funds.188
Institutional Framework
As previously stated, the necessity of internationalizing the fight
against money laundering arises from the gaps between legal systems and
jurisdictional challenges where the money launderer exploits facilities and
institutions located in more than one jurisdiction and subject to potentially
divergent domestic laws. The intergovernmental effort initiated by the G-7
expanded the international and transborder reach of anti-money laundering
efforts and purposes.189 The original membership of the FATF consisted of
184. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, Dec. 19, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 164, 28 I.L.M. 497.
185. See STESSENS, supra note 24, at 85–87.
186. On the other hand, the relative ease of obtaining such forfeitures may lead to law enforcement’s abuse of the forfeiture process.
187. To the extent that the possession of the proceeds of criminal activity increases the
probability of criminal liability and punishment and that confiscation deprives the wrongdoer of
the financial benefits of the crime, it is thought, the incentive to participate in criminal activities
will decrease.
188. See, e.g., Bachus, supra note 31, at 840–41; STESSENS, supra note 24, at 86–87 (both
describing the negative consequences of money laundering).
189. The aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks further broadened the targets of
the enforcement actions to include terrorist financing. On September 12, 2001, the United Nations
Security Council adopted Resolution 1368, condemning the September 11 attacks and urging
states to work together to fight terrorism. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
On September 28, 2001, the Security Council passed Resolution 1373, which provides that all
states must act to prevent terrorist financing. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28,
2001).
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the G-7 countries,190 the European Commission, and eight other countries.191 During 1991 and 1992, the FATF expanded its membership to
twenty-eight members, then to thirty-one in 2000 and to thirty-three in
2003.192 In 2007, the FATF expanded to the current thirty-four full members, consisting of thirty-two member jurisdictions and two regional organizations.193 Additionally, many international organizations with an antimoney laundering mission among their functions are accorded FATF observer status.194 The FATF also collaborates with the private sector and the
general public, although these relationships do not fall within the spectrum
of membership.195 These varying levels of membership increase the
FATF’s legitimacy since many nonmember jurisdictions are included in
FATF proceedings.196 At the same time, partial membership allows the
FATF to limit the influence of certain jurisdictions over the organization’s
decisions and policies.197
The Forty Recommendations are divided into four broad categories:
recommendations directed toward legal systems, those directed toward financial institutions and nonfinancial businesses and professions, those addressing institutional and other measures necessary to combat money
laundering, and measures intended to ensure international cooperation in
190. See supra note 9.
191. Wessel, supra note 107, at 171. The eight other countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. FATF, ANNUAL REPORT
2006–2007, ¶ 2 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 ANNUAL REPORT].
192. About the FATF, supra note 95.
193. The current FATF members are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Hong Kong,
Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russia,
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. 2007
NCCT REPORT, supra note 11, at 18, ¶ 6. In order to qualify for membership, a country must
(a) be strategically important;
(b) be a full and active member of a relevant FATF-style Regional Body;
(c) provide a letter from an appropriate Minister or person of equivalent political
level making a political commitment to implement the FATF Recommendations within
a reasonable time frame and to undergo the mutual evaluation process; and
(d) effectively criminalize money laundering and terrorist financing; make it
mandatory for financial institutions to identify their customers, to keep customer records
and to report suspicious transactions; and establish an effective FIU [Financial Intelligence Unit], so that the country will be assessed fully or largely compliant with Recommendations 1, 5, 10 and 13, and Special Recommendations II and IV.
FATF, Member Countries and Observers FAQ, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/5/0,3343,en_
32250379_32236869_34310917_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
194. Members & Observers, supra note 38. These include, among others, Interpol, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, and the UNODC. Id. All FATF members are expected to comply with the Forty
Recommendations. Id.
195. 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 191, ¶¶ 47–51.
196. Wessel, supra note 107, at 195.
197. Id.
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the fight against money laundering.198 The Recommendations are not binding international law—they are merely “soft law,” so that their effectiveness depends on countries’ compliance.199 However, the voluntary nature of
the Recommendations has been questioned as a result of the actions taken
against noncompliant jurisdictions.200 Although the FATF itself has no enforcement mechanism, the organization has used a variety of methods (including the NCCT list) to exact compliance by both member and
nonmember jurisdictions.201
The membership of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD)202 overlaps significantly with that of the FATF,203
and the Paris headquarters of the OECD currently houses the FATF Secretariat. The OECD and the FATF are fully independent bodies.204 Nevertheless, the work of the OECD, particularly in the area of combating economic
crimes like corruption and tax fraud, is relevant to the work of the FATF.205
For example, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions requires signatory states
to take measures against laundering of money derived from the bribery of
public officials.206 Further, the OECD’s campaign against jurisdictions that
the organization determines are harmful tax havens, that is, employ harmful
tax practices, is closely intertwined with the FATF’s anti-money laundering

198. See Herbert V. Morais, Fighting International Crime and Its Financing: The Importance
of Following a Coherent Global Strategy Based on the Rule of Law, 50 VILL. L. REV. 583,
596–600 (2005).
199. Bachus, supra note 31, at 847.
200. Id. at 851.
201. Id. at 852; see discussion supra Part II.C.2.
202. The OECD grew out of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC).
THE OECD, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 9–10 (2008),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/33/34011915.pdf. The OEEC was formed in 1948
in order to implement the Marshall Plan. Id. at 9. The OECD, which was created as the economic
counterpart to NATO, took over for the OEEC in 1961. Id. The OECD is composed of thirty
“countries committed to democracy and the market economy.” OECD, About the OECD, http://
www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 11,
2009). The mission of the OECD is to “support sustainable economic growth, boost employment,
raise living standards, maintain financial stability, assist other countries’ economic development,
and contribute to growth in world trade.” Id.
203. Id. Several countries are members of the OECD, but not the FATF and vice versa.
204. FATF, General FAQ, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/26/0,3343,en_32250379_3223
6836_34312026_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
205. FATF, International Organisations, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/9/0,3343,en_3225
0379_32236869_35809865_1_1_1_1,00.html#CICADOAS (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
206. Id. The Convention institutes a peer-review system to ensure that signatory states implement OECD anti-bribery instruments, and this review process involves an assessment of antimoney laundering measures in the context of bribery. Id. Because of the common goals of these
distinct international bodies, experts from the OECD and FATF share information and experience
in order to combat these activities. Id.
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work and there is a close overlap between the list of tax havens issued by
the OECD and the jurisdictions included on the FATF’s NCCT list.207
FATF Evaluation Mechanisms
In order to ensure compliance with the FATF’s anti-money laundering
standards and procedures, two monitoring mechanisms are in place: selfassessment exercises and mutual evaluation procedures.208
Self-Assessment. Each member country completes a yearly self-assessment exercise, consisting of responses to questionnaires aimed at evaluating
the effectiveness of the country’s implementation of the Recommendations.209 These questionnaires are examined by the FATF to determine individual and FATF-wide performance.210
Mutual Evaluations. Mutual evaluations, the second monitoring mechanism, are much more detailed than are the self-assessment exercises. These
evaluations assess whether the laws and regulations required by the Recommendations are in force and effective.211 The FATF has developed very
detailed procedures to conduct these evaluations, with the aim of ensuring
fair and consistent evaluation.212 The assessment process lasts about ten
months to one year, and is conducted by a team of four to six selected
experts in the legal, financial, and law enforcement fields, together with up
to two members of the FATF Secretariat.213 The assessment team makes an
on-site visit to the country and produces a detailed written report assessing
the jurisdiction’s anti-money laundering system.214 These reports are shared
with all FATF members and observers, discussed at the plenary meetings of
the FATF, and published once adopted.215 The FATF has emphasized the
importance of the free exchange of these reports among all assessor bodies,
including the FATF, the FSRBs,216 and the internal financial regulatory
bodies of each jurisdiction, in order to assure consistent application of the
207. When the lists were first released in the summer of 2000, ten countries appeared on both
the FATF’s NCCT list and the OECD’s list of harmful tax havens: the Bahamas, the Cook Islands,
Dominica, the Marshall Islands, Niue, Nauru, Panama, Liechtenstein, St. Kitts-Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Benjamin R. Hartman, Coercing Cooperation from Offshore Financial
Centers: Identity and Coincidence of International Obligations Against Money Laundering and
Harmful Tax Competition, 24 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 253, 254, 261 (2001).
208. Bachus, supra note 31, at 851.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 191, ¶ 16.
212. Id. ¶ 17. The methodology for these evaluations is laid out in the AML/CFT Assessment
Methodology, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/16/54/40339628.pdf. Also, the
AML/CFT Evaluations and Assessments Handbook for Countries and Assessors provides instruction for parties conducting the assessments. It is available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/7/
42/38896285.pdf.
213. 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 191, ¶ 18.
214. Id.
215. Id. ¶ 20.
216. Id. For more detail, see infra note 225.
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Recommendations.217 To that end, almost all assessor bodies have agreed to
share their reports and most have agreed to publish them.218 Two years after
a mutual evaluation, each member jurisdiction must submit a report to the
FATF indicating the progress it has made in areas identified as deficient by
the assessment.219
Compliance Mechanisms
As outlined earlier,220 the consequences to a FATF member of a failure to comply vary broadly, beginning with less aggressive enforcement
measures and building in severity as a country persists in noncompliance.221
The least aggressive measure entails application of peer pressure and requiring that the errant member submit progress reports at plenary meetings.222
If there is further noncompliance, the FATF President may send a letter or a
delegation to the country’s government, and upon further noncompliance,
the FATF may invoke Recommendation 21.223 Finally, the country’s membership in the FATF may be suspended.224
Nonmember Evaluation and Compliance
By virtue of their membership in an FSRB, some jurisdictions that are
not FATF members have agreed to become subject to the Forty Recommendations and to mutual evaluations.225 These countries undergo the mutual
evaluation processes conducted by their respective FSRBs, which are con217. 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 191.
218. Id.
219. Id. ¶ 21.
220. See supra Part II.C.2.
221. FATF, Monitoring the Implementation of the Forty Recommendations, http://www.fatfgafi.org/document/60/0,3343,en_32250379_32236920_34039228_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited
Feb. 11, 2009).
222. Id.
223. Id. This allows the FATF to issue a statement encouraging financial institutions to pay
“special attention” to transactions with that country. Id.
224. Id.
225. Wessel, supra note 107, at 182–83. Thus, FSRB member countries that are not members
of the FATF have accepted FATF money laundering standards through their membership in the
FSRB. Id. at 184. Some countries with full FATF membership are also members of an FSRB, but
many members of FSRBs are not FATF members. Members & Observers, supra note 38. Five
FSRBs hold associate member status with the FATF. Id. These include the APG (Asia/Pacific
Group on Money Laundering), the CFATF (the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force),
MONEYVAL (the Council of Europe Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of AntiMoney Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism), GAFISUD (the Financial Action
Task Force on Money Laundering in South America), and MENAFATF (Middle East and North
Africa Financial Action Task Force). Id. The three remaining FSRBs hold FATF observer status.
Id. These include the EAG (the Eurasian Group), ESAAMLG (Eastern and Southern Africa AntiMoney-Laundering Group), and GIABA (Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money-Laundering in Africa). Id. Because the FSRBs are able to consult with FATF members during the
decision-making process, the interests of many countries outside the FATF are taken into
consideration.
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ducted in the same manner as the FATF evaluations.226 Also, in 2002 the
FATF initiated a self-assessment process for nonmember countries, in
which more than one hundred countries have participated.227 However, the
FATF’s most effective mechanism for dealing with nonmember noncompliance with the standards is the NCCT list.228
D. Comparing the Regimes
The international anti-trafficking and anti-money laundering regimes
can be compared on a number of levels. Although other avenues of comparison and research would also be valuable in assessing the two regimes, this
article focuses on the following aspects: (1) the nature and forms of coordination (or lack thereof) among nation-states and the international organizations involved in or spearheading the efforts; (2) the institutional framework
created to combat the problems; (3) standard setting methodologies; (4)
targets of the regimes; (5) the nature and deployment of sanctioning mechanisms used to encourage compliance; and (6) the reputation of the regimes.
1. Coordination and Cooperation
The FATF effort is a top-down effort, initiated by powerful states (the
G-7) in order to combat a perceived threat of lawlessness, in particular, the
illicit drug trade.229 In contrast, the anti-human trafficking regime responds
to bottom-up pressure from civil society: in the international sphere, human
rights and women’s rights NGOs pushed for an international instrument
specifically targeting human trafficking, while domestic activists (and some
engaged lawmakers) were the impetus for the passage of the TVPA.
The top-down approach and the political support of powerful states
(strengthened after September 11, 2001) have had significant effects on the
power, structure, and organization of the anti-money laundering institution.
A key example is the seemingly inevitable acquiescence of individual states
to the standards proposed by the FATF. Even though the standards do not
enjoy treaty status under international law, political support for the FATF
and the organization’s ability to demand from its members the economic
shunning of Recommendation 21230 have engineered the dissemination and
spread of the Forty Recommendations as the preeminent anti-money laundering norm regime. In order for individual states to comply with the
norms, they become part of the network of self-assessments, mutual evaluations, and monitoring coordinated by the FATF and the regional FSRBs.
226. 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 191, ¶ 16.
227. FATF, 2002–2003 ANNUAL REPORT ¶ 29 (2003).
228. The NCCT list was discussed supra Part II.C.
229. As mentioned supra Part III.C., the scope of the anti-money laundering regime has been
broadened to target terrorist financing.
230. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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In contrast, the UN Trafficking Protocol, although a treaty under international law, has evoked less complete compliance and/or coordinated response both by the States Parties and nonsignatories. The lack of
compliance may be related to the bottom-up approach231 as well as to the
consensus-based negotiations that ended in the creation of the instrument.232 This contrast in compliance levels may reflect both the creation of
weaker norms due to the need for consensus in negotiating the provisions of
the Protocol as well as an inability to put in place an enforceable sanctioning mechanism that would create greater incentive for compliance.
2. Institutional Framework
The institutional frameworks of the two regimes also contrast. The
anti-money laundering fight is spearheaded and monitored by a single purpose intergovernmental international organization funded by annual contributions from its members.233 The limited membership allows greater ease
of decision-making,234 as only thirty-four viewpoints must be accommodated.235 Further, the fight against money laundering has given rise to regional anti-money laundering organizations that coordinate with each other
and with the FATF with respect to information gathering and monitoring in
order to ensure compliance with standards and to speed up reactions to new
forms of money laundering.236 Additionally, the anti-money laundering regime is able to link into existing intergovernmental and privately regulated
financial and monetary institutions and industries in order to increase the
sources of information gathering and scope of monitoring.237
In contrast, the efforts of the institutions involved in the international
efforts against human trafficking are less coordinated or focused. The negotiations leading to the drafting and opening for signature of the Transna231. A bottom-up approach may elicit less ardent reactions from states, to the extent that the
issue does not appear to affect the interests or survival of the leaders or governments of individual
states and arises among the general population.
232. That is, the challenges of achieving consensus among a large number of negotiators are
less likely to result in either hard obligations or effective sanctioning mechanisms.
233. 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 191, ¶ 55.
234. All decisions of the FATF are taken by consensus of these thirty-four members. Id. ¶ 8.
235. See supra note 225 (regarding the representation of nonmember interests through the
mechanism of the FSRBs).
236. See discussion supra Part III.C.; supra notes 193, 225 and accompanying text.
237. See supra Part III.C. (regarding the organizations and groups that are FATF observers).
Both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are also supportive of the FATF’s antimoney laundering efforts. See Bachus, supra note 31, at 856–57. In addition, Recommendation 26
of the Forty Recommendations provides that each country should establish a central FIU (Financial Intelligence Unit), which “serves as a national centre for the receiving (and, as permitted,
requesting), analysis and dissemination” of money laundering information. FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 26. The Interpretive Note to Recommendation 26 provides that when a country
develops a FIU, the FIU should consider becoming part of the Egmont Group—the international
organization of FIUs. Id. The Egmont Group fosters international cooperation and information
sharing. See Bachus, supra note 31, at 855–56.
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tional Crime Convention and Trafficking Protocol were conducted within
the United Nations—the preeminent universal membership international organization. More voices and interests could be aired and considered before
consensus could be reached. This reality inevitably weakened the obligations created under the treaty as well as the treaty’s coercive power.
The Trafficking Protocol did not create an independent, special-purpose standing body with oversight over human trafficking, the power to
create standards, or the power to sanction. The United Nations itself is a
multipurpose organization, and the Conference of the Parties created by the
Transnational Crime Convention is not dedicated solely to the efforts
against human trafficking. The Convention’s Conference of the Parties,
which meets annually, has oversight over both the reporting required by the
Transnational Crime Convention itself and the reporting required by the
other Protocols to the Convention.238 Although the UNODC was made custodian of the Convention, including the Trafficking Protocol, the UNODC’s
responsibilities are broad, encompassing many other transnational crimes.
In addition, while the UNODC has the power to monitor and issue reports
on trafficking and other crimes, it does not have the power to create standards nor to enforce them. The other UN agencies or officials with mandates or responsibilities related to human trafficking (such as the UN
Special Rapporteur on Human Trafficking) also do not have sanctioning or
standard-creation power. UN.GIFT, the new anti-trafficking initiative that
came into being in 2007, creates opportunities and a framework for cooperation and coordination among UN and other anti-trafficking organizations,
but lacks coercive power.239 Moreover, until the formation of UN.GIFT,
there was no official framework through which to cooperate and to coordinate anti-trafficking efforts.
As discussed in Part II, the United States applies its own internally
generated anti-trafficking standards with extraterritorial purpose and effect.
Some scholars have expressed concern that those standards may conflict
with or undermine the standards of the Trafficking Protocol.240 Further, the
unilateral enforcement mechanism deployed by the United States lacks both
the deterrent effects of the coordinated activities of FATF members and
nonmember adherents to the Forty Recommendations as well as the selfassessment and mutual evaluation components of the international antimoney laundering regime.
238. The other Protocols to the Transnational Crime Convention are the Protocol Against the
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/383 (Nov. 15, 2000) Annex 3;
and the Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and
Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/255, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/383/Add.2 (May 31, 2001).
239. See discussion supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions
to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437, 466–74 (2006).
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3. Standard Setting Methodologies
The standards formulated, issued, and enforced by the FATF, including the Forty Recommendations, the Nine Special Recommendations, and
the NCCT criteria, are the product of a collaborative expert-rich process
that involves constant monitoring and review of the information gathered
by the FATF and the regional FSRBs. Within the FATF, the Ad Hoc Committee identifies new money laundering methodologies, and works toward
countering those methodologies through revision of the operative standards.241 In addition, the standards deployed by the FATF are global in
scope: they are used in the self-assessments and mutual evaluations conducted by individual jurisdictions and under the auspices of the FATF and
the FSRBs.242
In contrast to the FATF effort, the international anti-trafficking actors’
efforts are not coordinated and directed within a coherent and cohesive umbrella. In issuing the annual TIP Report, in order to determine the appropriate Tier placement of countries that are deemed to have a significant
trafficking problem, the U.S. State Department employs the unilateral U.S.
standards enunciated by the U.S. legislators in the TVPA.243 The measurement of an individual country’s efforts is conducted by the State Department based on information gathered from various sources within individual
countries, including government officials from those countries.244 Unlike
the FATF, the United States does not publicize the reports and other information gathered in its monitoring and information gathering process.245
Other international anti-trafficking entities and initiatives, such as the
Council of Europe and UN.GIFT, are engaged in formulating global antitrafficking standards.246 However, these efforts at coordinating international
anti-trafficking efforts are not bolstered by sanctioning mechanisms analogous to those deployed toward the international propagation of anti-money
laundering efforts.
241. See discussion supra note 112. To that end, the Forty Recommendations have been revised twice since their first issuance in 1990. For more detailed discussion of the revisions, see
infra note 265.
242. See supra note 131.
243. The State Department employs a threshold figure of “100 or more victims” to determine
whether a country is a country of destination, transit, or origin. See 2008 TIP REPORT, supra note
1, at 12.
244. As described in the 2008 TIP Report, the State Department
use[s] information from U.S. embassies, foreign government officials, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations, published reports, research
trips to every region, and information submitted to tipreport@state.gov. . . . U.S. diplomatic posts reported on the trafficking situation and governmental action based on thorough research, including meetings with a wide variety of governmental officials, local
and international NGO representatives, officials of international organizations, journalists, academics and survivors.
2008 TIP REPORT, supra note 1, at 11–12.
245. See ZHANG, supra note 40, at 121.
246. See, e.g., supra note 172 (listing the anti-trafficking publications of UN.GIFT).
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4. Targets of the Regime
The international anti-money laundering regime more successfully
targets the private actors actively involved in the illicit activity than does
the anti-trafficking regime. The FATF anti-money laundering regime imposes obligations on government actors247 to adopt the FATF standards and
to transpose those standards into domestic law. The global spread of the
FATF’s standards and compliance by even the most recalcitrant NCCTs
have resulted in the imposition of a relatively uniform regulatory web focused on financial institutions and industries worldwide, including banking,
insurance, and others related to the movement of money.248 The obligations
imposed on state actors also includes the creation and empowerment of domestic regulatory agencies with independent power to regulate domestically, share information across borders, and otherwise cooperate
internationally.249 The standards, therefore, connect and intertwine with the
functioning of both public and private actors.
The international anti-trafficking regime involves acceptance by individual countries, through accession to the Trafficking Protocol, of obligations to prevent and prosecute human trafficking and to extend protection to
victims of trafficking. Obligations under the Trafficking Protocol are, in
many respects, less mandatory and more hortatory.250 The Trafficking Protocol requires that States Parties criminalize the trafficking of humans, but
does not identify specific industries or professions that should be targeted
for regulation and monitoring.
The U.S. TIP Report, through individual country narratives, praises the
formation of task forces created to address an individual country’s trafficking problem and the promulgation of anti-trafficking legislation in fulfillment of obligations under the Trafficking Protocol.251 However, perhaps
because the trafficking of humans manifests differently in each country, no
one particular profession or industry is necessarily targeted. Neither the
model anti-trafficking legislation issued by the United States252 nor
UN.GIFT targets specific industries.
247. Those obligations include criminalization of money laundering, creation of regulatory
agencies, and international cooperation. See description of the Forty Recommendations, supra
Part III.C.
248. Other industries and professions targeted for regulation by the FATF include accountants,
lawyers, real estate brokers, casinos, and car dealers, among others.
249. That is, each jurisdiction must create a domestic entity to monitor its financial system (a
financial intelligence unit or FIU). See discussion supra note 237 and accompanying text.
250. Contrast, for example, the language of the Trafficking Protocol and the Council of Europe Anti-Trafficking Convention discussed supra note 44. See also Chuang, supra note 240, at
448 (noting the aspirational nature of the Trafficking Protocol’s delineation of States Parties’
obligations to victims of trafficking).
251. See, e.g., 2008 TIP REPORT, supra note 1, at 245–46 (describing the anti-trafficking efforts of the government of Timor-Leste).
252. See generally Model Law to Combat Trafficking in Persons (2003), available at http://
www.humantrafficking.com/humantrafficking/toolkits_ht3/DOS_Model_Law.htm.
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5. Sanctioning Mechanisms
The sanctioning mechanisms at the disposal of the FATF surpass by
far the sanctioning mechanisms available in the fight against human trafficking. Pursuant to Recommendation 21 of the Forty Recommendations,
the FATF has the power to deploy escalating coercive mechanisms that may
conclude in the financial shunning of the recalcitrant country or jurisdiction.253 With respect to FATF member states, the FATF first will apply peer
pressure and require the noncompliant member to submit progress reports at
Plenary meetings.254 If the noncompliant member continues to be uncooperative, the FATF President may send a letter or a delegation to the country’s
government and, upon further noncompliance, the FATF may invoke Recommendation 21.255 This procedure allows the FATF to issue a statement
encouraging financial institutions to pay “special attention” to transaction
with the noncompliant member.256 Finally, the noncompliant member’s
membership in the FATF may be suspended.257 With respect to nonmember
countries and jurisdictions, the naming-and-shaming device of the NCCT
list is brought to bear. The negative reputational effects are bolstered by the
power and threat of the application of Recommendation 21.
The only sanctioning mechanisms deployed in the international antitrafficking regime are the unilaterally imposed sanctions of the United
States. The United States does not coordinate with other States Parties to
the Trafficking Protocol to target noncompliant territories and countries and
encourage their adherence to international standards. Further, as discussed
in Part II.C.1, sanctions have been imposed against only a small subset of
noncompliant jurisdictions.
6. Reputation
Finally, the reputations of the two regimes contrast sharply. The international anti-trafficking regime is widely perceived as ineffective,258 and
demonstrates shortcomings that are similar to the shortcomings of the international human rights regime generally—the inability to impose credible
sanctions, and reliance on sometimes ineffective and politically flawed
naming-and-shaming efforts.
Secondly, the U.S. TIP Report is marred by suggestions of U.S. exceptionalism259 and the apparent role of political considerations in determining
253. See supra note 114 for the text of Recommendation 21.
254. See supra note 114 for the text of Recommendation 21.
255. See supra note 114 for the text of Recommendation 21.
256. See supra note 114 for the text of Recommendation 21.
257. See supra note 114 for the text of Recommendation 21.
258. See, e.g., 2006 GAO REPORT, supra note 6.
259. The U.S. State Department does not rank the anti-trafficking efforts of the United States
in the annual TIP Reports, nor is the United States assigned a Tier ranking. However, the TIP
Reports now describe U.S. anti-trafficking efforts, and include an acknowledgement that the
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country rankings and the imposition of sanctions.260 And, as discussed in
Part III.D.3, the universality of inclusion on the list has tended to diminish
the impact of its intended naming-and-shaming value.
In contrast, the FATF standards may be described as the “gold standard” in the international anti-money laundering sphere.261 The placement
(or not) of individual territories on the NCCT list262 has been somewhat
marred by the suggestion of political maneuverings.263 Nevertheless, the
targeted jurisdictions are generally held to deserve their inclusion on the list
based on perceived noncompliance with the widely accepted FATF
standards.264
The aura of independence and fairness may also stem from the FATF’s
participatory information gathering methodologies and the availability of
avenues for input by experts as well as actors within the targeted industries.265 The methodology underlying listing and placement on the U.S. TIP
Report, which contrasts with the information gathering mechanisms that
lead to the FATF’s NCCT Reports, undoubtedly also contributes to the
skepticism regarding the objectivity and accuracy of the TIP Reports.266
United States, like other countries, could improve its anti-trafficking efforts. See, e.g., 2008 TIP
REPORT, supra note 1, at 51.
260. See, e.g., Chuang, supra note 240, at 482–85; see also ZHANG, supra note 40, at 120–21
(describing conflict between aggressive anti-trafficking policies and diplomatic needs).
261. See, e.g., STESSENS, supra note 24, at 17 (describing the Forty Recommendations as “the
crown jewel of soft law” on money laundering). In addition to urging UN members to implement
the Forty Recommendations, the Security Council took note of the primacy of FATF anti-money
laundering standards. See S.C. Res. 1617, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005).
262. As well as on the harmful tax haven list issued by the OECD.
263. See, e.g., KRIS HINTERSEER, CRIMINAL FINANCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONEY
LAUNDERING IN A COMPARATIVE LEGAL CONTEXT 24 (2002) (discussing political maneuverings to
omit some European jurisdictions from the NCCT list); see also Wessel, supra note 107, at 181.
264. See Wessel, supra note 107, at 176 (noting that “political considerations do not . . .
always dominate” and that Israel and Russia, two powerful states, have been designated NCCTs).
265. In addition to input from FSRBs and other observer organizations, the policies and initiatives of the FATF are discussed during Plenary meetings which are held three times per year. See
FATF, The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering-FATF, available at http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/32/31/34048008.pdf [hereinafter FATF Brochure]. Additionally,
emerging money laundering methods, trends, and threats, as well as effective countermeasures,
are reviewed at a yearly typologies meeting. Id. Also, Ad Hoc groups discuss issues relevant to
particular geographic regions and special topics requiring detailed analysis. Id. Ad Hoc groups
have specific mandates, and they meet on the margins of the Plenary meetings and report to the
Plenary. Id. The FATF also holds a Financial Services Forum every two years to discuss topics of
common concern with members of the financial services sector. Id. All decisions of the FATF are
taken by consensus of the FATF members and are based on papers prepared by the Secretariat and
written and oral reports from various groups. Id.
266. The U.S. TIP Report is based on information from consular officers of the United States,
as well as NGO and media sources within specific jurisdictions. See supra note 244. The information and assessments underlying placements on the NCCT list, or other designation of noncompliance, are based on a more in-depth evaluation, often from expert sources. The detailed standards
for inclusion are published in the FATF’s Annual Reviews. See, e.g., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 191.
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Finally, while self-evaluations are an integral part of the FATF’s
processes, despite reported information gathering from government officials, it is unclear that self-evaluations by individual countries play a role in
TIP Report rankings. There is very limited involvement of jurisdictions in
monitoring and evaluating themselves—ranks are assigned by the U.S.
State Department. The participatory process of regular self-evaluations and
mutual self-assessments creates active engagement in norm assessment and
evaluation at the governmental and leadership levels. This active engagement stimulates norm dissemination and penetration in individual jurisdictions in a manner that is quite different from the governmental reactions to
the U.S. TIP Reports, which are viewed as the imposition of blame by
outsiders.
E. Assessing the Regimes
Has either the FATF’s international anti-money laundering or the international anti-human trafficking regime been successful in decreasing,
preventing, and prosecuting trafficking and/or in decreasing the opportunities for criminals to launder dirty money and enjoy that money in the legitimate economy? Does the apparently greater success of the FATF’s NCCT
list, as compared with the U.S. TIP Report and the efforts of the Conference
of the Parties of the UN Transnational Crime Convention indicate that the
international anti-money laundering regime is more effective than are the
international anti-trafficking efforts? Success could be evaluated through
assessment or measurement of, among other things, the following proxies:
(1) a decrease in the incidence of the targeted activity; (2) greater compliance with the standards formulated to combat the activity; (3) evidence of
norm building and penetration within civil society, interest groups, regulated industries, and governmental spheres; and/or (4) participation in and
coordination of activities against the targeted activity.
1. Anti-Human Trafficking
The combination of the U.S. TIP Reports and the Reports of the Conference of the Parties to the Transnational Crime Convention tells a complicated story. The prodding and threatened sanctions of the U.S. TIP Reports
have awakened the majority of the world’s territories and countries267 to the
fact that individual countries and the international community as a whole
have a significant trafficking problem (at least, as determined by the standards of the U.S. legislation and regulations) and that it is not merely a
problem that occurs “elsewhere.”
In the face of the threat of the imposition of U.S. sanctions, the vast
majority of countries have been persuaded to take action against human
267. One hundred and seventy countries are listed, ranked, and described in the 2008 TIP
Report. 2008 TIP REPORT, supra note 1, at 44.

\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-1\UST109.txt

2008]

unknown

Seq: 50

FOLLOW THE MONEY?

15-JUN-09

12:35

187

trafficking within their borders. Those countries have moved up in the rankings from Tier 3 to Tier 2 or Tier 2 watch list through efforts such as the
creation of task forces, the passage of domestic anti-trafficking legislation,
and the prosecution of traffickers. A perhaps even more critical step for
individual jurisdictions is the signature and ratification of the Transnational
Crime Convention, the Trafficking Protocol, and other international instruments, accession to which the United States has determined demonstrate a
good faith attempt on the part of a jurisdiction to address its trafficking
problem and participate in the international efforts against human
trafficking.268
However, the failure of a substantial proportion of the States Parties to
the Trafficking Protocol to submit reports to the Conference of Parties may
indicate a problem with this sunny picture. The failure to report may simply
indicate a jurisdiction’s lack of resources to conduct the required self-evaluation. On the other hand, it may indicate that accession to the Trafficking
Protocol and its obligations is seen as no more than an instrumentalist strategy designed to avoid the opprobrium of the United States, as well as a
resistance to and/or refusal to allow the penetration of U.S.-formulated antitrafficking norms into domestic policy making levels. Indeed, resentment of
the United States for the TIP placement, often without prior warning, of an
individual country may serve to harden resistance to attempted norm penetration. For example, the minute movement upward from Tier 3 to Tier 2,
then a stubborn, years-long sojourn on the Tier 2 watch list by a country
such as Armenia lends credence to this hypothesis.269
The 2008 TIP Report depicts mixed developments with respect to the
prosecution and conviction of suspected traffickers: according to the Report, in 2003, 7992 prosecutions were brought, resulting in 2815 convictions.270 By 2007, 5682 prosecutions resulted in 3422 convictions.271 A
review of the numbers indicates that, despite the increase in the adoption of
anti-trafficking legislation,272 the number of cases prosecuted has de268. The rankings of individual countries on the TIP Report are influenced by, among other
things, their accession to and/or ratification of the following international instruments: the Trafficking Protocol; ILO Convention 182, Elimination of Worst Forms of Child Labour; Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution
and Child Pornography; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Armed
Conflict; ILO Convention 29, Forced Labour; and ILO Convention 105, Abolition of Forced Labour. 2008 TIP REPORT, supra note 1, at 280–83.
269. Armenia was first ranked as a Tier 3 country in 2002. Its efforts in response to that
ranking were rewarded in 2003 by its ranking at Tier 2. After maintaining its Tier 2 ranking in
2004, the country was placed on the Tier 2 watch list in 2005 and has remained at that ranking on
the 2006, 2007, and 2008 TIP Reports.
270. 2008 TIP REPORT, supra note 1, at 37.
271. See id.
272. The 2008 TIP Report indicates that there were 24, 39, 40, 21, and 28 new anti-trafficking
legislative adoptions in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, respectively. 2008 TIP REPORT, supra
note 1.
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creased. However, both the percentage and absolute numbers of successful
convictions have increased. The gap between prosecutions and/or convictions and the number of individuals estimated to be trafficked273 is both
conspicuous and daunting.
With respect to the question whether the international anti-trafficking
efforts have resulted in a decrease in the incidence of trafficking, this author
has seen and is aware of no such claim. Estimates of the scope of the occurrence of human trafficking vary, and numbers of estimated victims vary
according to the organization or person issuing such numbers (perhaps due
to variations in operative definitions). However, this author knows of no
organization that claims to have noted a decrease in the trafficking of
humans. Instead, new countries (and new cases of trafficking) are added
each year to the TIP Reports,274 and with the growth in awareness and possible law enforcement (and perhaps community) disapprobation, victims
may be subjected to more secrecy and the victims’ exploitation more successfully hidden.
The inspiring tales of anti-trafficking warriors give great heart.275
However, might the expansion in the number of anti-trafficking activists
and organizations merely indicate a logical response, in individual aid-dependent countries, to the incentive provided by the attention, resources, and
criteria for the disbursement of monies devoted by the United States and
other countries toward anti-trafficking efforts?
Nevertheless, trafficking scholar Professor Susan Tiefenbrun opines
that “the TVPA has not only made progress in the domestic fight against
trafficking, but it has also positively impacted attempts made by other nations to deter this transnational crime.”276 The factors highlighted by Professor Tiefenbrun as the bases for this conclusion include the increase in
anti-trafficking aid given by the United States to other countries, the increase in anti-trafficking investigations, arrests and prosecutions in foreign
countries, and the anti-trafficking efforts, including the passage of legislation, by governments of foreign countries.277
273. For example, antislavery activist Kevin Bales estimates that 27 million individuals are
enslaved worldwide. KEVIN BALES, DISPOSABLE PEOPLE: NEW SLAVERY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 8–9 (2004). The International Labour Organization estimates that 12.3 million individuals
are enslaved. INT’L LABOUR ORG. OFFICE [ILO], ILO MINIMUM ESTIMATE OF FORCED LABOUR IN
THE WORLD 2 (2005) (prepared by Patrick Belser, Michaelle de Cock, & Farhad Mehran), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_norm/—-declaration/documents/publication/wcms_081913.pdf.
274. The 2001 TIP Report listed and ranked 70 countries; the 2008 TIP Report lists and ranks
170 countries. 2001 TIP REPORT, supra note 8; 2008 TIP REPORT, supra note 1.
275. See, e.g., 2008 TIP REPORT, supra note 1, at 40–43.
276. Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Updating the Domestic and International Impact of the U.S. Victims of Trafficking Protection Act of 2000: Does Law Deter Crime?, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
249, 280 (2006–2007).
277. Id. at 272–78.
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2. Anti-Money Laundering
Despite the fact that the FATF’s Forty Recommendations were first
published in 1990 and the NCCT initiative began in 2000, there has been
surprisingly little research into the FATF’s effectiveness. Currently, there is
no empirical method to assess the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering regime.278 Peter Reuter and Edwin Truman, leading scholars of the antimoney laundering regime, note that research on money laundering is even
more difficult than it is for most other crimes, because there are no victimization surveys, and population surveys are unlikely to provide much information.279 However, Reuter and Truman assert that anti-money laundering
regimes are amenable to research and that such research will be helpful in
the fight against money laundering.280
Despite the research difficulties, some sources give the overall impression that the success of the FATF has been relatively limited. For example,
according to Reuter and Truman:
Sifting of the limited available information suggests that the
global [anti-money laundering] regime has made progress in the
general area of prevention, but without much effect on the incidence of underlying crimes. Critics argue that the regime has
done little more than force money launderers to change their
methods . . . . Critics may well be right.281
Evaluation of the success of the work of the FATF turns on the definition of
“success.” For example, one may take the stance that levels of cooperation
with the FATF by member and nonmember jurisdictions in assessment and
endorsement of the Forty Recommendations is the appropriate measure of
effectiveness.282 Pursuant to this stance, in light of the number of mutual
evaluations of nonmembers that have been carried out by the FSRBs and
the IMF and the number of countries that have endorsed the Forty Recommendations through FSRB membership, there is little question that the work
of the FATF has been tremendously successful.
Some studies have attempted to address the effectiveness of the FATF,
but, due to the difficulties mentioned above, the approaches taken are indi278. REUTER & TRUMAN, supra note 23, at 190–92.
279. This research challenge is strikingly similar to that confronted in the fight against human
trafficking. The trafficked person is often unable or reluctant to self-identify as such, making the
quantitative gathering of information quite challenging, and creating barriers to effective law
enforcement.
280. REUTER & TRUMAN, supra note 23, at 190–92 (the coauthors suggest, among other methodologies, the tracking of the use of suspicious activity reports, measurement of the costs of antimoney laundering regimes, and the use of economic modeling).
281. Id. at 192.
282. Wessel, supra note 107, at 186–87 (“To a significant degree, the procedural carrots given
to non-members have succeeded in inducing compliance; the FATF has received completed selfassessment questionnaires from 130 jurisdictions, many of which are non-members. This number
mirrors the level of jurisdictions that have endorsed the Forty Recommendations.”).
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rect. For example, scholars Jackie Johnson and Y.C. Desmond Lim adapted
another researcher’s method to evaluate the effectiveness of the FATF in
decreasing the relationship between countries’ banking sectors and money
laundering.283 Johnson and Lim claim that it is virtually impossible to judge
the size of the money laundering problem because of its secretive nature.284
As a consequence, to measure the link between banks and the legal and
illegal economies in FATF member and nonmember countries during the
pre- and post-FATF periods, they used the crime rate as a proxy variable for
the “illegal economy.”285 The study found that, following the formation of
the FATF, a majority of FATF member countries saw a decreased correlation between the banking sector and the illegal economy.286 Further, the
study found that in the post-FATF period, on average there is a much
stronger relationship between banks and the illegal economy in non-FATF
countries.287
Although this study casts the work of the FATF in a positive light, it is
important to acknowledge its limitations. First, in order to capture both the
pre- and post-FATF periods, the time frame of the study ranges from 1980
to 1996. The first NCCT list was not published until 2000. As a result, this
study cannot be seen as a reflection of the success of that initiative. Therefore, this study reflects only the success of the FATF’s Forty Recommendations among FATF member countries. Further, the research methodology
used is far from perfect: Reuter and Truman assert that the research methodology from which this study was adapted is “at a very aggregate level that
reflects only the most schematic knowledge of money laundering.”288 In
sum, the proxies selected for examination in the study may be ill-suited to
measurement of the standards’ effects, if any, on money laundering in the
jurisdictions examined.
In a recent study, Professor Johnson analyzes the mutual evaluation
data of sixteen FATF members and twenty-one non-FATF countries to determine the similarities and differences between the two groups.289 Profes283. See Johnson & Lim, supra note 27 (that is, whether the standards operate to successfully
close off the banks as an avenue for the laundering of money).
284. Id. at 7.
285. Id. at 10.
286. Id. at 18.
287. Id.
288. REUTER & TRUMAN, supra note 23, at 191. Johnson and Lim recognize the limitations of
using the crime rate as a proxy variable for money laundering, noting that “critics may argue that
crimes such as murder and rape are not motivated by financial gain.” Johnson & Lim, supra note
27, at 10. They respond that this criticism is not totally justified, given that many of these violent
crimes are used by organized crime groups that profit indirectly from them. Id. While this may be
true, it is still difficult to justify the inclusion of all crimes in the proxy variable for money
laundering.
289. Jackie Johnson, Is the Global Financial System AML/CFT Prepared?, 15 J. FIN. CRIME 7,
7 (2008). The study was possible because, unlike in previous years, the FATF made available to
the public the reports from the third round of mutual evaluations, which began in 2005. At the
time of the study, sixteen FATF members had been evaluated. Id. at 8. The countries evaluated
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sor Johnson describes the global anti-money laundering regime as
“porous.”290 He found the anti-money laundering systems of both FATF
members and nonmembers to be poor and that countries’ lack of compliance with the global standards “leaves so many holes in these countries’
regulatory, financial, and legal systems that money laundering with or without any relationship to the financing of terrorism, would be relatively easy
to achieve.”291 According to Professor Johnson’s study, average compliance
levels for both member and nonmember countries vary significantly; however, the spread of average compliance scores is wider for non-FATF members.292 Although FATF members have greater average compliance levels,
both member and nonmember jurisdictions have low compliance ratings
with regard to certain recommendations.293 Self-evaluations indicated that
FATF members believed that they were close to full compliance with the
nine Special Recommendations, but the mutual evaluation reports imply
that this is not the case.294 According to Johnson, the lack of compliance
among jurisdictions that have demonstrated a commitment to an anti-money
laundering regime through their FATF or FSRB membership creates doubts
about the anti-money laundering regimes in less regulated countries.295 In
addition, Johnson expresses doubt about the possibility that there will ever
be a united global response to money laundering.296
Despite Professor Johnson’s bleak assessment, this study may not necessarily invalidate the FATF’s work against money laundering. The study
assesses one point in time after the Forty Recommendations had already
been in place for a number of years. While the study shows disappointing
levels of compliance among member and nonmember countries, there are
no pre-FATF numbers with which to compare the results, and it is possible
that the work of the FATF has greatly improved the global anti-money
laundering framework, but there is still much work to be done.297
Other commentators and scholars have pointed to deficiencies in the
international anti-money laundering regime. Herbert Morais notes that
were Australia, Belgium, China, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. FSRBs conduct mutual evaluations of their member countries using the same assessment criteria used by the
FATF in assessing its members, and the FSRBs have begun making these public as well. Id. In
these mutual evaluation reports, the reviewers assess a country as noncompliant, partially compliant, largely compliant, or fully compliant with each of the Forty Recommendations. Id.
290. Id. at 20.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 16–17.
293. Id. at 16.
294. Id. at 20.
295. Johnson, supra note 289, at 20.
296. Id. at 20–21.
297. Similarly, through public education and greater public awareness, the work of the United
Nations and the United States may have had substantial impact on the incidence of trafficking. It
is difficult to capture quantitatively the number of persons who were not trafficked because of
increased anti-trafficking efforts.
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countries’ and financial institutions’ levels of compliance with substantive
anti-money laundering rules have been “somewhat disappointing” and identifies several reasons for this problem.298 Likewise, Alison Bachus notes
that although some progress has been made, further anti-money laundering
initiatives are necessary.299 For example, Bachus points to the surprising
fact that, as of April 2003, only $3 billion in laundered funds had been
seized in the twenty-year fight against money laundering—an amount equal
to the monies thought to be laundered in three days!300 Another commentator, Todd Doyle, gives a mixed review of the success of the FATF. He notes
that the reporting and disclosure requirements imposed on banks by the
Forty Recommendations have, according to “almost universal assessment,”
done little or nothing to curb the practice of money laundering.301 In light of
these criticisms, the argument might be made that the FATF’s efforts, including the NCCT list, are merely a superficial success.
Further, some aspects of the FATF’s international anti-money laundering initiatives raise questions regarding their legitimacy. Firstly, the power
of a limited-member intergovernmental organization to impose binding
standards on nonmember countries and territories appears to challenge the
principle and practice of sovereign equality—a foundational principle of
international law. According to Doyle, the NCCT initiative seems to have
been successful in accomplishing the FATF’s goals, but the use of sanctions
in order to exact compliance would violate international law.302 The demand to and the acquiescence of juridically coequal nation-states that domestic resources and priorities be changed so as to satisfy standards created
without their participation or consent raises additional questions regarding
the democracy of the process. It removes the ability of the governments of
those territories and countries to make their own considered determinations
of the legislative, policy-making, and resource-commitment priorities for
their domestic spheres.
Secondly, the fact that the G-7 created the FATF, and the seeming
overlap of the FATF’s anti-money laundering efforts with OECD/G-7 priorities of combating “harmful tax havens” fuels the suspicion that the
FATF’s efforts are part of a calculated anticompetitive campaign by more
powerful nations. Pursuant to this perspective, the G-7 and its agents—the
298. Morais, supra note 198, at 626. Among them are the disparities in the national laws
between jurisdictions, weakness of institutions responsible for enforcement (particularly in small
Pacific islands), the high cost of compliance, and the lack of political will. Id.
299. Bachus, supra note 31, at 870.
300. Id.
301. Todd Doyle, Cleaning Up Anti-Money Laundering Strategies: Current FATF Tactics
Needlessly Violate International Law, 24 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 279, 294 (2001–2002).
302. Id. at 297–98 (“[O]n one hand the FATF is to be commended for its heavy-handed and
almost instantly effective approach, especially after a decade of lukewarm results; on the other,
the group’s threatened ‘ultimate recourse,’ if instituted, might well jeopardize the integrity of
some of the most important documents undergirding the anti-money laundering effort.”).
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OECD and FATF, among others—create and maintain coercive rules and
structures that uphold their dominance and control of the institutions, rules,
and mechanisms of international economic law.303 It is certain that, for
many nations, the interaction of money laundering and terrorist financing
efforts with the legitimate financial structures and networks have raised
fundamental national security concerns.304 However, the possibility is real
that the anti-money laundering initiatives and frameworks perpetuate the
dominance of already powerful countries.305
The anti-money laundering model may represent the triumph of a
model that makes an end-run around the principles and doctrines of traditional international law because the model would and could not have been
created and maintained with the full consent of sovereign states. Countries
and jurisdictions comply despite the affronts to sovereign equality because
they, particularly island territories with limited natural resources or ability
to engage fully and/or benefit from globalization, are dependent on continued access to world markets, financial institutions, and networks.306
The crucial role of Recommendation 21 of the Forty Recommendations (authorizing the “tak[ing] of appropriate action”)307 in achieving the
levels of state compliance is clear. Unfortunately, the international anti-trafficking regime has no analogous mechanism. Sanctions by the United States
alone (to the extent that they are indeed imposed)308 do not have the same
effect as does the “financial shunning” deployed by the FATF and its members as well as jurisdictions that adhere to FATF standards. The monitoring
and evaluation conducted pursuant to the UN Transnational Crime Convention (and Trafficking Protocol) are a pale shadow of the monitoring networks and institutions of the anti-money laundering regime.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that both the international anti-money
laundering and international anti-human trafficking regimes have succeeded
in increasing awareness about their targeted illicit activities. However, the
actors that they target differ. The international anti-money laundering regime, which is viewed as highly technical, targets governments (for adop303. See, e.g., UGO MATTEI & LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS ILLEGAL
35–63 (2008) (analyzing the international economic framework as a system of neocolonial
exploitation).
304. That concern is evidenced by the following Security Council Resolutions: S.C. Res.
1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001), and S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept.
28, 2001).
305. See, e.g., HINTERSEER, supra note 263, at 248, 254–57 (discussing the overlap between
the FATF’s efforts and the OECD’s harmful tax initiative, as well as the issue that the OECD’s
initiative is anticompetitive).
306. In this regard, it is noteworthy that even such an isolationist government as Myanmar’s
was finally forced to comply with the FATF’s standards despite its initial recalcitrance.
307. See supra note 114 for the text of Recommendation 21.
308. See supra note 64 (describing sanctions actually imposed by the United States on countries ranked as Tier 3).
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tion of anti-money laundering legislation and processes) and law
enforcement (for increased investigations and prosecutions of money launderers), while the fight against human trafficking stimulates governments
and law enforcement as well as greater engagement of civil society
participants.
Further, it may be argued that the great success of the anti-money laundering regime is the creation of a regulatory structure of global reach and
with global impact.309 The difference in the institutional frameworks of the
two efforts is striking. Perhaps due to the fact that awareness about human
trafficking arose among civil society groups, the anti-trafficking efforts are
less integrated and coordinated, and more atomized, while the more coordinated response to money laundering results from the fact that awareness
about and reactions against money laundering arose from the state, specifically the law enforcement community.310
In addition, the greater acquiescence of individual states to the imposed anti-money laundering standards may evidence the convergence of
the interests of the elites and governments of those states with the interests
of the initiators of the international efforts against money laundering. That
is, it is more important and central to the survival of those governments and
elites that they be able to access international monetary and financial systems than that they comply with anti-human trafficking standards. Indeed,
to the extent that the perpetuation of human trafficking and other forms of
exploitation are vital to the health of the economies of some countries,311
and also serve to enrich those elites and benefit those governments, the
contrasting rates and nature of compliance is completely logical.
Finally, it may be argued that the apparently more effective international anti-money laundering effort may owe its success to a longer history
of coordinated law enforcement and nation-state mobilization against international money laundering. After all, the FATF was formed in 1989, a full
decade before the 2000 adoption of the Trafficking Protocol by the UN
General Assembly. Several counterarguments occur with respect to this issue. Firstly, as discussed in Part III.B, the international fight against the
enslavement of humans is centuries long, and there is general consensus
that human trafficking is a modern form of slavery. Further, under international law, the prohibition against human slavery has attained the status of a
peremptory norm of international law—no state may derogate from the duty
to prohibit the activity and enforce the norm. Lastly, the prohibition against
309. On the other hand, does it merely create more bureaucracy?
310. But see Wessel, supra note 107, at 190 (“[T]he FATF is heavily influenced by the lawand-order contingent of the civil-liberties/security spectrum.”).
311. Examples might include Thailand and Vietnam, countries that are well known for their
sex-tourism industries. The question may also be asked whether the role of money laundering in
the economic development of some states is similar to the role of human trafficking and/or human
smuggling in the economic development of other states.
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slavery is repeated in fundamental international law instruments, such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, among others.
In light of the long history, it appears that the contrasting successes
and differing types and levels of efforts to combat the two global problems
may stem from contrasting degrees of political will. The fight against
money laundering and the corruption of the international financial system
may be more important to the powerful countries that have spearheaded the
efforts against both activities and to the survival of the global community of
nations than is the fight against the trafficking in human beings.312 This
may be the case because the victims of trafficking are most often portrayed
as women and children who come from economically vulnerable countries
and territories, or are burdened with more vulnerable socioeconomic statuses and/or come from disadvantaged regions and/or groups within individual countries.
IV. FOLLOW
A.

THE

MONEY?

Introduction

The modern rise and spread of human trafficking did not elicit from
the G-7, the OECD, or the United Nations the coordinated efforts that came
in response to the laundering of money. The failure to craft a coordinated
reaction to human trafficking may arise from, among other things, a combination of two factors: (1) the perception of human trafficking as a human
rights issue,313 which is traditionally dealt with pursuant to softer, more
consensual international law mechanisms, and (2) the perception that the
laundering of money and its integration into and corruption of legitimate
financial networks is more of a threat to nation-state actors than is the trafficking in human beings.314 Further, with respect to internal trafficking and/
or enslavement,315 states are more reluctant to interfere with or intervene in
issues concerning another state’s treatment of its citizens (there appears to
be a stronger proprietary interest of states over their citizens than over their
economies) as compared to the willingness to intervene in economic mat312. This speculation is bolstered by the global financial and monetary upheavals that began
in 2008.
313. The fact that the Trafficking Protocol falls under the law enforcement rubric of the UN
Transnational Crime Convention does not trump this perception. The Trafficking Protocol is a
product of intensive lobbying and interest from civil society, in particular women’s rights groups,
not only from law enforcement interests. See, e.g., Chuang, supra note 240, at 442–43 (discussing
the active participation of women’s rights NGOs in the negotiations leading to the Trafficking
Protocol).
314. Even if the largest estimate of modern human slaves (27 million according to Kevin
Bales, see BALES, supra note 273, at 8–9) is correct, that is a small proportion of the current world
human population, which is estimated to be more than 6.5 billion. U.S. Census Clock, http://www.
census.gov/main/www/popclock.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
315. The definitions of trafficking do not require that the trafficked person is moved across
international and domestic borders. An individual may be trafficked and/or enslaved within the
borders of the state in which that individual is a national or resident.
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ters.316 Reluctance may stem from, among other things, a sense that nationstates, individually, “own” or have a proprietary interest in their citizens
and inhabitants in a manner that they do not “own” their own access to
international financial institutions and networks.
The contrasting effectiveness of the anti-money laundering regime appears to offer some avenues for reform toward a more effective international anti-human trafficking regime. However, before such a proposition
would garner adherents, some challenges must be identified and acknowledged or addressed. These challenges include issues such as conceptualization of money as opposed to conceptualization of people, the political will
of members of the international community, and the practical question of
whether the human trafficking industry’s link to legitimate economies can
be as clearly identified and targeted as has been the link between money
laundering and banking and financial sectors.
B. Conceptual Challenges
Two layers of conceptual distinctions are at issue here. The first issue
is whether money and its laundering are or can be analogous to the traffic in
persons. The second is the reaction among policymakers, participants, and
the public to the two distinct activities—money laundering and human
trafficking.
1. Money Versus People
Money is perceived as a neutral or positive commodity which is owned
and which may move in and out of legality. That is, the mechanism through
which money is earned and/or attained may “stain” it so that it becomes
“dirty money” or “blood money.” However, that stain is not readily apparent to recipients of or traders in that money, so that, whatever its origins, the
“dirty” or “blood” money may be exchanged for goods and services, and/or
held against future needs.
Secondly, money is purely the creation of state issuance and perceived
creditworthiness and acceptance by the state’s inhabitants, bolstered and
supported (vis-à-vis other currencies) by the strength of the issuer state’s
economy and reputation. Money would and could not exist in the absence
of legal sanction of the state. In the absence of state issuance (or of private
bank issuance sanctioned by the laws of the governing political entity),317
other types of less efficient value exchange mechanisms, such as barter systems, would need to be used.
316. Contrast, for example, the extreme interference and monitoring of nation-states’ economies by international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank (IMF conditionality is a very pertinent example) versus interference to protect the human
rights of a jurisdiction’s nationals.
317. Bank notes issued by individual private banks may be used as units of exchange.
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The ideal conception of human beings, however, differs. Human beings, in contrast to money, may no longer legally be owned.318 Human beings have an intrinsic nonmonetary value that is independent of the state in
which they are inhabitants or nationals. Biological beings, their production
or creation is not dependent on the state’s support or status, and a human
being cannot be “dirty” because of his/her origins.
A deeper analysis of the foregoing statements reveals that, while these
statements are philosophically, idealistically, and morally true, in reality
they are not true. A human being may come into being without the legal
sanction of the state, but that sanction or power does determine the human’s
value. For example, citizens of Western states are more “valuable” than are
citizens of less-developed countries. Citizenship largely determines status—
whether or not the individual human is accepted as belonging to an economically powerful or economically weak state.319
Further, a human can be “dirty”—that is, illegal. A human may be
marked as suspicious by virtue of national origin, race or ethnicity, and/or
the state’s official approval or disapproval of that human’s presence within
its territory. The unsanctioned presence of an individual human, like the
presence of money in some cases, evidences the perpetration of illegal activity. And, like money, the human being can weave in and out of illegal
status based on the application of the differing domestic laws of individual
states as well as amendments to those laws.
However, the predominant conceptualization of money as a creature of
the state and of the human as an independent free-standing being creates
other barriers. The reaction to the loss of financial privacy represented by
anti-money laundering laws and activities has received only muted response.320 On the other hand, it is certain that regulation of or targeting, for
anti-trafficking purposes, a wider array of industries that may play a role in
sexual and other privacy issues may rouse greater reaction and concern
about civil and human rights.
2. Money Laundering Versus Human Trafficking
The conceptual challenge and question that must be addressed with
respect to adapting the international anti-money laundering model to the
318. Since the abolition of slavery, chattel slavery has been legally forbidden by most, if not
all, states.
319. The ratio of values can be determined through a review of actuarial tables and/or values
and premiums of and for life insurance policies in different countries. Values will vary as well
within countries according to the skills and occupations of individuals. Media reports bear out this
claim. In the United States, for example, stories involving crimes against white females and minors garner much more media coverage and societal angst than does the victimization of
minorities.
320. See, e.g., HINTERSEER, supra note 263, at 234–35 (discussing the impact of the Forty
Recommendations on “both civil liberties and property rights”); see also Wessel, supra note 107,
at 189–90.
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international human trafficking regime is whether the conceptual differences give rise to civil society and governmental reactions that are so divergent that the political will to combat trafficking in a similarly coordinated
manner would not emerge.
Conceptual deference is given to the state’s evaluation and legal treatment of money laundering as a result of money’s perceived dependence on
the state, the nature of state control, and money’s capacity to appear legal
when it is in fact illegal. Money laundering is viewed as relatively more
sophisticated and technical than human trafficking, and as highly dependent
on the legislative and regulatory pronouncements and determinations of the
state. An increase in money laundering or a crackdown on money laundering therefore is unlikely to create an upsurge of civil society interest or
pressure on the state to eradicate it. The average person is unlikely to be
able to perceive the link between money laundering and consequent social
ills—it is seen as a thing apart, which requires expertise as a precondition
for involvement and understanding. Even when there is a perceived rise in
the indicators of social ills tied to money laundering, the public may not
perceive a causal link or other connection.
Human trafficking, on the other hand, evokes a visceral reaction in
individuals and civil society. It is an activity which an average person might
believe him/herself to be capable of detecting. The human-to-human exploitation of trafficking is readily perceived as undesirable and a violation
in modern societies where slavery has been de-normalized. As a result, civil
society organizations and activists are more likely to react to the trafficking
in humans and to push for legislative and other remedies and to initiate
bottom-up movements against it. However, the effectiveness of these reactions may be undermined by the implicit acceptance of prostitution and of
many forms of labor exploitation within individual societies.
From these distinct ways of perceiving money and money laundering
in contrast to views of human beings and trafficking in humans, it appears
inevitable that anti-money laundering initiatives and strategies should
spring from above, that is, from the governments of states. It also seems
inevitable that economically powerful states with a greater stake in the
functioning of the existing international financial and monetary networks
and institutions should be most concerned about addressing this issue. Finally, then, it is probable that the top-down approach from the powerful
economies should produce a cohesive and overtly effective anti-money
laundering regime.
This insight is further bolstered if domestic immigration laws are
viewed as the efforts of individual states to regulate the exit and entry of
individual humans (potentially dirty/illicit) into their territory. The interrelationship among immigration laws, migrant smuggling, and human traffick-
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ing is well documented.321 An overlay of international law lays out the
prerequisites of state hospitality to refugees and state treatment of migrant
workers.322 However, the domestic immigration laws of individual states
regulate and attempt to bar the entry of undesirable humans. According to
that viewpoint, the framework for the criminalization, confiscation, detention, reporting, and information gathering with respect to illicit people (including trafficked and otherwise exploited persons) already exists on the
domestic level of individual states. However, these domestic human interception laws, unlike anti-money laundering laws, are not coordinated within
an international legal framework. Further, they are not aimed at the prevention of human trafficking, but at the protection of the state against the unsanctioned entry of individual humans, including trafficked persons.
A further conceptual complication emerges in light of the FATF antimoney laundering efforts’ apparent insults to sovereignty and nation-state
regulatory autonomy.323 The international anti-money laundering regime, in
addition to pressures on nation-state sovereignty, also raises issues of potential conflict with civil and human rights.324 The right to economic privacy is
affected by the broad scope of the information gathering that is mandated
by the international anti-money laundering standards. The human rights of
opponents of authoritarian regimes may be negatively affected by the information sharing among jurisdictions facilitated by the FATF-inspired coordination.325 Even more, might internationally coordinated targeting of
specific industries and modes of communication negatively affect the civil
and human rights of individual humans? Some obvious examples include
information gathering and monitoring of sexual activities and communications. Might the attempt to combat the egregious scourge of human trafficking create greater violations of other types of rights by the state?326
321. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S.
Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977 (2006).
322. See, e.g., International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. Doc. A/Res/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990);
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 6 I.L.M. 78.
323. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 207; see also Doyle, supra note 301, at 298–305.
324. For example, the activity of the UN Security Council with respect to counterterrorist antimoney laundering activities creates potentially alarming consequences with respect to human
rights. For a discussion of some consequences of the Security Council’s post-September 11, 2001,
anti-terrorism/money laundering sanctions, see José E. Alvarez, The UN’s ‘War’ on Terrorism, 31
INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 238, 246 (2003). Professor Alvarez discusses how the new UN antiterrorism
regime is “presenting opportunistic states with a ready formula for trampling upon the rights of
political or other opponents in the name of the war on terrorism.” He further notes that “[h]uman
rights groups are recording with alarm the number of perennial human rights violators—from
Egypt to China—now lining up to justify new or old repressive criminal laws and procedures” in
the name of the sanctions regime.
325. For example, dissidents’ attempts to hide resources abroad may be undermined by transborder information sharing. See Wessel, supra note 107, at 189–90.
326. The example of the civil and human rights violations resulting from the United States’
international anti-terrorism efforts is a daunting and deterrent one.
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C. Priorities
The intersection and interdependence of world financial and monetary
systems may lead to a conclusion that the fight against human trafficking
and the fight against money laundering logically deserve different political
and international reactions. It may be argued that the threat of money laundering does merit a more coordinated, concrete, and enforceable reaction
than does the crime of human trafficking, whether because of the potential
damage to the legitimate financial and monetary networks, because the
availability of this service encourages commission of more crimes, or because the risk of financing terrorist activities is such a threat to nation-state
existence.
There are two fallacies to this argument. First, the efforts against
money laundering and human trafficking do not conflict with each other. It
is possible for the international community to simultaneously pursue campaigns against both. Second, the potential damage from money laundering
may appear to be clearer and more imminent, but this perception may stem
from a failure to understand and tabulate the full scope of the damage
wrought by the traffic in humans.
The comparatively less urgent political will to create a stand-alone international organization to combat human trafficking may also stem from a
perception that the involvement of nationals of a state or territory with
human trafficking makes the issue a domestic one, the international regulation of which would interfere with state sovereignty more than does the
international regulation of money laundering. Or, perhaps, money laundering may appear to represent a greater threat to individual state sovereignty
than does the trafficking in humans, even if some of the trafficked individuals are citizens of that state.
However, it would not be necessary to persuade all members of the
United Nations to adopt and deploy a tighter set of standards and sanctioning mechanisms against human trafficking. The members of the G-7 formed
the FATF in response to the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Through the Trafficking Protocol, the members of the United Nations have similarly spoken against
human trafficking. By the same token, the G-7 or an analogous intergovernmental institution could take action in this regard. However, the (lack of)
political will of members of the G-7 is a barrier to the creation of a similar
single purpose intergovernmental organization to spearhead and guide the
international fight against human trafficking.
D. Practical Challenges to Implementation
Which mechanisms and elements are crucial to the apparent success of
the anti-money laundering regime and should be transposed into the antihuman trafficking regime? Which should be prioritized? The crucial mecha-
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nisms that appear suitable for transfer are self-assessments, mutual evaluations, regional monitoring and oversight, and effective institutional reaction
to noncompliance.
In thinking of adapting anti-trafficking efforts to use anti-money laundering measures, are the differences between trafficking and money laundering insuperable? Banks and financial institutions, among others,327 are
essential links between the criminal or the corrupt leaders and/or officials
attempting to hide the evidence of their crimes and to enjoy the laundered
money in the legitimate economy. It is this link, this parasitism endemic to
money laundering, that makes the targeting and monitoring of banks and
other financial institutions an essential element of anti-money laundering
efforts. Are there comparable legitimate institutions which are essential to
and/or integrally linked to human trafficking?
Humans who are trafficked are exploited within a diverse array of legitimate enterprises. The varied industries in which human trafficking has
been implicated include construction, agriculture, restaurants, and domestic
service, among others. There may be no one, or even no central, industry or
sector, the information gathering from which and the monitoring and regulation of which would increase the trafficker’s costs and serve as a disincentive to human trafficking. In addition, some may contend that, since human
trafficking is one of the predicate crimes the proceeds of which the criminal
may seek to launder, the regulation and monitoring of the financial industry
already serves to combat trafficking as effectively as it creates barriers to
other predicate crimes.
The potential targets of anti-human trafficking monitoring and regulation by states may be so widely dispersed—they include the sex industry
and industries that consume cheap labor, such as domestic service, construction, restaurants, agriculture, employment agencies, landlords, hospitals, Internet and mobile phone service providers, and immigration agents—
that the identification of a suitable target or proxy may be impossible and
the regulation and monitoring of too many points of contact may be administratively challenging and self-defeating. However, the sex and hospitality
industries, and the mechanisms used to communicate with prospective clients, such as newspapers, magazines, and the Internet, may be appropriate
targets for heightened monitoring and information gathering obligations.
Further, general workplace safety regulation enforcement would also provide an effective tool for monitoring and information gathering targeted at
trafficking for labor exploitation.
Once the question of the identification of targets has been settled, other
challenges for implementation include determination of how to regulate and
gather information from these contact points (newspapers, hotels, travel
agencies, etc.). One problem is that the contact points will differ in each
327. Other targeted points of contacts include accountants, real estate agents, and lawyers.
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region, country, and jurisdiction. Further, it is unclear whether, unlike the
financial industry, there is sufficient existing expertise in the intersection of
human trafficking and the legitimate economy to allow the creation or framing of standards and targeting mechanisms aimed at thwarting the traffickers and/or disrupting their criminal activity.
Another challenge is presented by the necessity of framing a sanctioning mechanism that is closely related to the underlying noncompliance. In
money laundering, the “take appropriate measures” language of Recommendation 21 authorizes a series of measures that can result in financial
shunning of the noncompliant country. Is it possible to identify an analogously aligned target of sanctioning as part of a more concrete and enforceable set of anti-human trafficking standards? The links between human
trafficking and the legitimate economy are so widespread that it is difficult
to identify a particular link, the targeting of which would lead to more effective anti-trafficking measures.
Perhaps, however, it is only a matter of time. The anti-money laundering regime is characterized by influential standard setting, followed by buyin by parties (countries and transnational financial organizations). The
name-and-shame device is applied after suspected NCCTs are provided an
opportunity to comply with existing standards. In contrast, the anti-human
trafficking regime is characterized by weak international standard setting
and unilateral U.S. standards backed by a name-and-shame device that is
enforced by unilateral U.S. sanctions. If anti-human trafficking efforts are
still in the standard-setting phase,328 norm dissemination and acceptance by
additional actors may lead inevitably to more effective measures.
V. CONCLUSION
In-depth analysis leads to the disappointing possibility that the FATF’s
anti-money laundering regime as epitomized by the NCCT initiative and list
is no more “successful” in eradicating the targeted activity than is the international fight against human trafficking. Instead, the apparently greater
compliance may evidence no more than the greater political will and coordination of powerful countries on a matter that is vastly more important to
those states and central to their continued dominance, that is, the health and
control of the transnational monetary, financial, and banking networks—
than is the trafficking of humans—merely a more severe form of already
widespread exploitation of individual humans.
Although no definitive answer is yet possible regarding the relative
effectiveness and success of the two regimes, it does appear that the
328. Note, however, that the long-standing prohibition against slavery and the ius cogens status of that prohibition indicate that the dissemination of the norm is already widespread.
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FATF’s anti-money laundering mission and campaign is more effective.329
Some of these mechanisms and methodologies have been identified in this
article, and there is little doubt that, if there is political will, some aspects of
the anti-money laundering model could be adopted and adapted to the international fight against human trafficking.
An obstacle to implementing such measures is the true importance to
the international community of the efforts against human trafficking. What
is the nature and strength of the political will to combat and attempt to end
human trafficking? Identifying and adapting the mechanisms and methodologies of the anti-money laundering fight that could be effectively deployed
in the global campaign against the trafficking of human beings is but the
second, less difficult step.

329. That is, if success means effective norm creation, dissemination, and penetration; credible enforcement mechanisms; and global coordination and cooperation through a single-purpose,
powerful international body with limited membership and broad participation.

